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This thesis explores why and how the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) changed from 
having an offensive to a clearly defensively postured fighter fleet. The Combat Aircraft 
Analysis, carried out at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE) in 1970-74, 
was seemingly fundamental for this relatively sharp change in RNoAF fighter plans for 
wartime. The Analysis is therefore placed at the core of this thesis.  
During the 1950s and 1960s the wartime use of RNoAF fighters was clearly offensively 
postured. SNOWCAT missions illustrate this quite well. These were wartime RNoAF fighter-
bomber missions into Soviet and WP territory, aiming to pave the way for Western nuclear 
bombers. However the 1970-74 Combat Aircraft Analyses brought changes. The 2a scenario 
and the selection of ‘holding time’ as Measure of Effectiveness are crucial both for the basis 
and the prerequisite to the Analyses. The 2a scenario described a limited-size Soviet invasion 
in north Norway. ‘Holding time’ was the total time defending forces could prevent Soviet 
forces from reaching their invasion objectives; i.e. taking control over the Bardufoss region. 
The definition of a pre-determined budget-size seems to have played an almost equally 
important role. The overall aim of the Analyses was to find what effect various usage of 
combat aircraft, including the use of resources on associated support functions, would have on 
‘holding time’ as a whole. 
One of the primary roles of the NDRE was to provide advice and a basis for defence planning.  
It was therefore important to manage and carry out Analyses that would result in conclusions 
on which long term defence planning decisions could be made. The idea was simply to make 
new RNoAF fighters contribute to the overall defence of Norway in the best possible way. As 
Norway could not fight off a Soviet invasion alone, the ‘best way’ would be to prevent the 
Soviets from reaching their objectives before our Allies could get to Norway’s assistance. The 
Analyses left no doubt as to how RNoAF fighters could contribute to the most ‘holding time’: 
This would be achieved through flying Defensive Counter Air and Anti-Shipping war-
missions. The best candidate, given the amount of resources foreseen to be available, would 
be a fighter corresponding to the characteristics of Combat Aircraft Class nr 3; in short 
described as a simple fighter-bomber.  
With that the focus was clearly changed from an offensive to a defensive use of RNoAF 
fighters. Instead of SNOWCAT missions into Soviet and WP territory, the RNoAF war time 
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In 1969 Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) doctrine was revised. However, its closing 
remarks were identical to the previous edition: An Air Force is by nature offensive. Offensive 
action is in line with RNoAF traditions; it shall mark our attitude and be held up on every 
occasion.1 In 1970 the ‘Analysis of alternative allocation of resources in the Combat Aircraft 
Sector for the period 1975-1990’ was initiated at the Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment (NDRE). 2 Four years later the Analysis strongly recommended that priority be 
given to Defensive Counter Air (DCA) and, to some extent, Anti-Shipping operations for 
RNoAF fighters.3  
It is quite a conventional view, as discussed in the Norwegian Defence History and in the Air 
Force History, that RNoAF fighters were, from the beginning of the 1980s and onward, 
intended for defensive purposes. The priority on DCA operations were in line with the overall 
national plans for defending Norway.4 It could be held that the 1970-74 Analysis de facto 
constituted a new doctrine for the RNoAF. Certainly both preparations as well as principles 
for the use of air power were discussed in the Analysis, and it has been argued that the 
concept that underlay the F-16 deal heralded the end of a long doctrinal line.5  The plans to 
use RNoAF fighters mainly in a defensive air-to-air role in case of a Soviet attack was well 
known and generally accepted as a sound idea.  
The Analysis took a broad view on the resources available to the combat aircraft sector, 
considering also the relationship with Army and Navy assets, aiming to optimize the use of 
combat aircraft in the defence of Norway in case of a Soviet invasion. The Control and 
Warning (K & V) System was examined leading to recommendations on how fighter aircraft 
should be controlled and directed, and also identifying the need to initiate a project for 
recommending new radars. The Analysis studied the allocation of resources to the 
Maintenance Branch and Air Bases in general, opting to create a best possible balance 
between producing as many fighter sorties a possible and preserving the ability to operate 
                                                 
1
 Håndbok For Luftforsvaret 95-1, Luftoperasjoner. Prinsipielle retningslinjer for bruk av luftstridsmidler, 
(Oslo: Sjefen for Luftforsvaret, 27. juni 1969), chapter 15. Original text: [Et luftvåpen er av natur offensivt. 
Offensiv handling er i pakt med Luftforsvarets tradisjoner; det skal prege vårt holdningsmønster og komme til 
uttrykk ved enhver anledning.] 
2
 Ragnvald H Solstrand, ’Analyse av alternative anvendelser av ressurser i kampflysektoren for perioden 1975-
1990’, NDRE Report S12 (1975), p.5. 
3
  I will from this point refer to the 1970-74 study as the “Analysis”. 
4
 Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth and Rolf Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 5, [the Norwegian Defence 
History ] 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004); Svein Duvsete, Luftforsvarets Historie, [the Air Force History ] 3 
vols (Oslo: Aschehoug & Co, 2004). 
5
 Øistein Espenes and Nils Naastad, ‘The RNoAF – A Multipurpose Tool during the Cold War’, Air Power 
History 47 (2000), p. 49.  
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from the air bases after enemy attacks. The Analysis thus helped pave the way for the 
introduction of the Norwegian Adapted Hawk system (NOAH), a surface-to-air missile 
system mainly used for defending RNoAF air bases.   
Given the focus on using RNoAF fighters in an offensive role in the 1950s and 1960s, it is my 
view that the conclusions of the 1970-74 Analysis were fundamental for the relatively sharp 
change in the planning of RNoAF fighter aircraft usage in times of war. Thus, rather than 
aiming to discuss doctrinal change as such, this thesis set out to explore how and why the shift 
from an offensive to a clearly defensively postured fighter fleet came about. In doing so the 
Analysis, with particular attention to a few vital aspects studied therein, is placed at the very 
core of the thesis. 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is mainly chronologically structured. However, due to the nature of the particular 
subjects, some parts have had to be thematically structured. The thesis is divided into six 
chapters, with chapter 1 providing a presentation of the subject of the thesis and a brief 
account of its sources.  
In order to recognise and understand a change, it is often necessary to be familiar with what 
was altered. Hence, chapter 2 briefly describes the main events in the history of the 
Norwegian fighter fleet from World War II until 1970. It surveys American influence and 
weapons aid, NATO plans and doctrines, and relevant national policies, plans and priorities. 
The chapter describes the difficult first post-war years, the build-up and expansion in the 
1950s, and the more temperate 1960s.  
Chapter 3 explores aspects of the NDRE, and describes how the Analysis was carried out. The 
chapter starts with a description of the NDRE System Group and a brief explanation of the 
characteristics of operations and systems analyses. This is followed by an examination of the 
Soviet threat as it was contemporarily perceived, including NATOs assessment of the Soviet 
threat. Chapter 3 is aimed at elucidating the fundamental basis for the Analysis, with 
associated assumptions.  
In chapter 4 the 1970 preparatory work for the Analysis is discussed in greater detail, with 
particular attention to the discussions on invasion scenario and measure of effectiveness 
(MoE). These elements were arguably the two most important components – as well as 
prerequisites – to the Analyses, and chapter 4 aims to shed light over the selection and 
establishment of these elements.  
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In chapter 5 the analysis of how to make best possible use of (new) RNoAF fighter aircraft is 
examined. The aim of the chapter is to describe how Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations 
were found preferable to Offensive Counter Air (OCA) operations. Likewise the chapter 
examines the conclusion that fighters should be used for Anti-Shipping operations, and not in 
direct support of own army units fighting a much larger and stronger Soviet invading force.  
 
In the final chapter selected aspects of the Analysis, viewed in retrospect, are commented 
upon and discussed. In summing up chapter 6, conclusions are presented about how and why 
the shift from an offensive to a clearly defensively postured RNoAF fighter fleet came about.   
Literature 
Given its implications, surprisingly little scholarly work has been written on the subject of the 
Analysis. However, a few works have touched upon it in a more general way, of which the 
‘Arms Deal – The Selling of the F-16’ by Ingemar Dörfer examines the process of purchasing 
the F-16 in four European countries (Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway) on both 
political and military levels. Along with the process of developing the Light Weight Fighter 
Dörfer also looks into the US Air Force and Navy perspectives. However, Dörfer deals only 
sparsely with the Analysis.6 In the book Århundrets Våpensalg [‘Arms Deal of the Century’] 
Hans C Erlandsen focuses on the role of Norway in the four European countries’ purchase of 
the F-16. Still, also Erlandsen primarily discusses political, economical and industrial 
aspects.7  
However, in volume 3 of Luftforsvarets Historie (the RNoAF History, published in 2004) by 
Svein Duvsete, the Analysis is dealt with over several pages. Likewise the Analysis, and 
implications thereof, are discussed and referred to in ‘Norsk Forsvarshistorie’ (the History of 
Norwegian Defence), both in volume 48 and volume 5.9 In the book ‘Kunnskap som våpen’ 
(The History of the NDRE 1946-1975) by Olav Njølstad and Olav Wicken the Analysis is 
quite thoroughly examined, though mainly based on how it set the terms for later NDRE 
analyses.10 Scholarly work such as the ‘Encyclopedia of Operations Research and 
                                                 
6
 Ingemar Dörfer, Arms Deal – The Selling of the F-16, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983) 
7
 Hans Christian Erlandsen, Århundrets våpensalg, (Oslo: Bedriftsøkonomens forlag, 1983). English title, 
translated by author: ’The Weapons Sale of the Century’. 
8
 Kjetil Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 4, 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004) 
9
 Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth and Rolf Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 5, 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 
2004) 
10
 Olav Njølstad and Olav Wicken, Kunnskap som våpen (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997) 
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Management Science’, edited by Saul I Gass and Carl M Harris,11 ‘The United States and the 
Cold War in the High North’ by Rolf Tamnes12 and the Fryktens Likevekt [‘Balance through 
Fear’] by Kjetil Skogrand and Rolf Tamnes,13 are representative for the type of secondary 
sources consulted in writing this thesis. 
The Combat Aircraft Analysis’ main results and conclusions were presented in NDRE Report 
S-12.14  The material supporting the S-12 was relatively massive, consisting of 36 classified 
NDRE reports.15 These reports, in addition to several other relevant documents at the NDRE 
Archives, have up to now been inaccessible due to their classification. In fact most of these 
reports were exempt from automatic declassification, which is often the case once 30 years 
have elapsed. However, in spring 2007 they were de-classified in the course of the research 
for this thesis, thus making them available as primary sources for my work. 
 
The nature of the NDRE reports and documents is predominantly ‘scientific’; typically 
covering a well defined part of a larger and more complex problem, and containing tables, 
calculations, graphs and so on. Making assumptions, however, are also a common feature of 
these reports. Such assumptions are openly stated and, as far as found herein, well explained 
and accounted for. The NDRE documents, together with Parliamentary and Governmental 
papers, national defence plans, air force doctrine, and NATO doctrines and documents, serve 
as the primary sources for my thesis. As such the amount and access to primary sources has 
been very satisfactory. However, it has nevertheless proved difficult to gain access to national 
intelligence archive sources. The Armed Forces HQ Intelligence Staff provided the NDRE 
Analysis with intelligence material regarding location, numbers and amount of Soviet military 
forces and equipment. Although correspondence between recently declassified NDRE and 
NATO documents indicate that the on-hand information about scenarios and on assessments 
of Soviet capabilities are adequate, access to contemporary national intelligence evaluations 
could nonetheless have been beneficial to my work. 
                                                 
11
 Saul I Gass, Carl M Harris (ed), Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science, (Norwell: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) 
12
 Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Cambrigde: University Press, 1990) 
13
 Kjetil Skogrand og Rolf Tamnes, Fryktens likevekt – atombomben, Norge og verden 1945-1970, (Oslo: Tiden 
Norsk Forlag AS, 2001) 
14
 Ragnvald H Solstrand, ’Analyse av alternative anvendelser av ressurser i kampflysektoren for perioden 1975-
1990’, NDRE Report S12 (1975) 
15
 FFI Saksarkivet 161, ’Jobb-Sluttmelding 242-S/161 – ”Analyse av alternative anvendelser av ressurser innen 
Kampflysektoren for prioden 1975-1990”, attachment ”Resultater”. 
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2 The pre-1970 RNoAF fighter fleet   
In April 1940 Hitler launched his offensive towards Denmark and Norway; operation 
Weserübung. Norway had no independent air force as such, but both the Navy and the Army 
had an air arm. A handful Norwegian Gloster Gladiators took off from Fornebu airport near 
Oslo early on 9 April, but was severely outnumbered and could do little harm to the invading 
German forces. According to Olav Riste the German attack on Norway was both strategically 
and tactically unexpected; a classic example of a successful strategic attack16.  
From November 1940, Norwegian pilots were trained at the base “Little Norway” near 
Toronto, Canada. Upon completion of training the pilots were sent to operational squadrons in 
the UK. Throughout the war Norwegian fighter squadrons were mainly based in England, and 
to some extent the Low Countries following the Normandy invasion. The Royal Norwegian 
Air Force was formed on 10 November 1944, by joining the air arms of the Navy and the 
Army.  
The first post-war years 
RNoAF fighter squadrons operated more or less as an integrated part of the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) during the war. In essence the post-war RNoAF consisted of two fighter squadrons; 
331 and 332 squadrons, with their roots in the Army Air Arm, and three maritime squadrons 
stemming from the Navy Air Arm17. The very close relationship to the RAF dominated the 
RNoAF during the first few post-war years. For a while the RNoAF fighter squadrons would 
keep their British aircraft, and three main tasks: air defence, tactical support of surface 
operations, and reconnaissance.   
Towards the end of the war the British had offered some defence equipment and material to 
Norway with the condition that Norway participate in the occupation of Germany. Norway 
accepted the British offer in March 1945.18 The Norwegian forces were positioned in the 
British sector, cooperating with British forces. Thus the relationship with the British would be 
strengthened, and at the same time this would not annoy the Soviet Union. It was in any case 
not the view of the government that Norway could defend herself alone.  
                                                 
16
 Olav Riste, ’Weserübung: Det perfekte strategiske overfall?’, Forsvarsstudier 4 (1990), p. 22 
17
 Svein Duvsete, Luftforsvarets Historie, 3 vols (Oslo: Aschehoug & Co, 2004), p. 13 and 51.  
18
 Kjetil Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 4, 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004), p.158.  
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The first three-year plan for the re-building of Norway’s armed forces, based on plans from 
the Army, Navy and Air Force respectively, was issued by the Department of Defence on 13 
September 1946. The plan stated that the Norwegian Armed Forces had to be able “to stand 
our ground until we get help from those who will be our allies”19. The Air Force plan was 
written by a group led by Adolf B Øen, later to be General Major and Chief of the RNoAF20. 
Øen was very familiar with both theories on air power and practical lessons from the war, and 
at the same time well aware of national political priorities. Unlike the Army and the Navy the 
young RNoAF had few old home-bases or traditions to return to. In the rather modest three-
year plan for the Air Force it was stated that it would be necessary to consolidate the position 
of the RNoAF, and gradually build an air force able to handle contemporary developments. 
Øen recognized the effectiveness strategic bombing could have in reducing enemy 
capabilities. However, Øen also realized the political situation and the restricted resources that 
would be available - the RNoAF would not be able to operate heavy bombers. Øen thus set 
aside the idea of extended use of Norwegian fighters for offensive operations; the primary 
task in war for the RNoAF would be to fight enemy air attacks21. The RNoAF plan was not 
very detailed; it merely outlined goals for the build-up of an air force: By 1949 the RNoAF 
should have three Spitfire fighter squadrons, two fighter-bomber squadrons, one maritime 
squadron, and one transport squadron. The two main tasks would be air defence and the 
support of army and navy operations22.    
For a short period Norway had the ambition of becoming a bridge-builder in the international 
arena. However, the European crises in 1948 led to a strengthened Norwegian conviction that 
the country needed to improve its chances of obtaining help in a crisis or war. In January 1949 
the attempt to establish a Scandinavian Defence Union was found to be unrealistic, and on 4 
April 1949 Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty. The treaty was seen as a traditional 
military pact; joining it first and foremost marked Norway’s intent and position23. In line with 
a traditional small state perspective Norway was sceptical about establishing an allied staff or 
                                                 
19
 Stortingsmelding nr 32 (1945-46), Plan for en første gjenreisning av Norges Forsvar, (Oslo: FD, 13. 
september 1946), p. 3. Original text: [.. holde ut alene inntil vi får effektiv hjelp av dem som måtte bli våre 
allierte]. 
20
 General Major Bjarne Øen was Chief of the RNoAF in the period March 15th 1946 – December 1st 1951. He 
became General and was Chief of Defence in the period January 10th 1957 - December 31st 1963. 
21
 Svein Duvsete, Luftforsvarets Historie, 3 vols (Oslo: Aschehoug & Co, 2004), pp. 36-39. 
22
 Stortingsmelding nr 32 (1945-46), Plan for en første gjenreisning av Norges Forsvar, (Oslo: FD, 13. 
september 1946), pp. 47-48. See also Svein Duvsete, ’Fra luftforsvar til strategisk angrep’, Forsvarsstudier 2 
(1998), pp. 46-48. 
23
 Kjetil Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 4, 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004), p.165. Original text: [først 
og fremst markerte intensjon og tilhørighet].  
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an allied supreme commander in peacetime. Such institutions were expected to be dominated 
by the great powers.  
The 1950s – expansion and build-up 
The post-war reconstruction of the country demanded a significant amount of resources, and 
the rebuilding of the armed forces was just one of many tasks. However, the Korean War 
brought changes to this undertaking. It was soon decided to make NATO a closely integrated 
organization, with its own command system. Also, steps were taken to coordinate the 
development of the member states’ military forces. In autumn 1950 NATO adopted the 
principle of forward defence. Adding substance to forward defence required a build-up of 
national armed forces in Europe, as well as support from the USA (soldiers, arms and 
equipment).24 In 1951 NATO established several commands under the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), US General Dwight D Eisenhower. NATO was no longer 
just a traditional military pact; it had become an integrated military defence organisation.25 
 
Although the Korean War led to a strong increase in Norwegian defence budgets, NATO and 
American programmes still covered much of Norway’s defence expenditures.26 In February 
1950 the Norwegian Parliament approved the Mutual Defence Assistance Program (MDAP), 
which was a bilateral agreement with the USA.27 For years to come Norway would receive a 
substantial amount of aircraft28 and other defence equipment from the USA through the 
MDAP, and the RNoAF has for this reason operated several types of US fighters and fighter-
bombers.29 From 1951 and onward NATO’s infrastructure programmes had, to a great degree, 
helped finance the construction of airfields, command-, control- and communication 
installations, as well as radar sites.30 
                                                 
24
 Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Cambrigde: University Press, 1990), p. 
64-65 
25
 Knut E. Eriksen and Helge Ø. Pharo, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, 6 vols (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 
1997), pp. 31-40.  
26
 Kjetil Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 4, 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004), pp. 255-56. For 1949/50 
the Defence Budget was 322 millions NOK For 1952/53 this had increased to 1.295 millions NOK.   
27
 Stortingsproposisjon nr 23 (1950), Om (1) Samtykke til å ratifisere avtale med Amerikas forente stater om 
gjensidig hjelp på forsvarets område(Våpenhjelpavtalen. (2) Fullmakt til å motta materiell under denne avtale. 
(3)Dekning av utgifter i forbindelse med våpenhjelpen.  (Oslo: FD, 3. februar 1950). 
28
 Jonn Bekkevold, ’Våpenhjelpen fra USA’, Luftled - Luftmilitært Tidsskrift 2 (1996), pp. 36-39.  Norway 
received more than 600 aircraft under the programme, of which some 400 fighter-bombers and fighters. 
29
 Tom Arheim and others, Fra Spitfire til F-16 (Oslo: Sem & Stenersen AS, 1994), pp. 256-57. The RNoAF 
operated 200 F-84G (1952-60), 64 F-86K (1955-67), 115 F-86F (1957-67), 19 F-104G (1963-83), 22 CF104 
(1973-83), and 92 F-5 A/B from 1966 and onward.  
30
 Rolf Tamnes, Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie, 6 vols (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1997), pp. 63-64. Norway 
received about NOK 33 billions (1995 value) via NATO infrastructure programmes during the cold war.     
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NATO issued DC 6/1, its first Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, 
in December 1949.  DC 6/1 stated that the over-all defense plans must provide […] the ability 
to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons, 
without exception. 31 The phrase all types of weapons makes it clear that nuclear weapons 
were included in this concept. Still, during the first half of the decade NATO planned on 
stopping a Soviet invasion in Western Europe using large conventional forces. Following the 
NATO meeting in Lisbon in February 1952 NATO issued MC 14/1,32 in which it was 
assessed that the enemy would have a preponderant advantage in ground warfare.33  The use 
of nuclear weapons was by no means ruled out, but in an attempt to stop a Soviet invasion – 
with the protection and preservation of Western European territory and peoples in mind – the 
use of nuclear weapons would clearly not be a natural first choice.   
 
With the Soviets in a position to provide a manpower pool for military purposes in excess of 
that which can be provided by the western powers the use of NATO air power would be vital 
in stopping the Soviet aggression, in two ways:34  Directly by the (immediate) use of tactical 
air support of own surface forces, and indirectly by a strategic air offensive against the enemy 
[as the] effect of this offensive on the defensive battle will be cumulative and may be 
decisive.35 The particularly large number of F-84 fighter-bombers given by the US (more than 
200 to the RNoAF and a total of some 2000 to European allies) can easily be seen to support 
this concept.36  
Based on the Lisbon meeting, national plans indicated that the RNoAF backbone would 
consist of 200 fighter aircraft; of which 150 would be fighter-bombers. By 1954 the RNoAF 
operated 150 F-84G fighter-bombers, divided into six squadrons. The Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG),37 an American group at the US Embassy in Oslo, described five of 
                                                 
31
 NATO:  DC 6/1 Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area, (December 1, 1949), see 
paragraphs 7 and 7a.  
32
 NATO: MC 14/1, A report on Strategic Guidance (December 9, 1952).  MC 14/1 reflects NATO’s intent to 
continue the build-up of conventional forces, in order to deter or if necessary to defend against a Soviet Union 
attack. See for instance page 12, where it is stated that [… as the conventional NATO forces at present in being 
fall far short of requirements, no relaxation can be allowed in their planned expansion ...].    
33
 Ibid p. 11. 
34
 Ibid pp. 10-11. 
35
 Ibid p. 13. 
36
 Kjetil Sogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 4, 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004), p. 204.. 
37
 Svein Duvsete, Luftforsvarets Historie, 3 vols (Oslo: Aschehoug & Co, 2004), pp. 94-95.  
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these RNoAF squadrons as effective and ready to go.38 Half way into the 1950s one can see 
the definite shape emerging for an offensive role for RNoAF fighters, compared to both the 
three year plan from 1946 and also to the FK 46 report (completed in 1949). 39 The latter 
recommended 8 squadrons of fighter aircraft in an air defence role, and prioritised much less 
fighter-bombers – only 2 squadrons. Thus the prioritisation of an offensive use of the fighter 
fleet seemingly stems more from NATO doctrine and plans and the type and amount of 
aircraft provided by the US through the MDAP rather than being the result of decision on 
Norway’s part.  
A conventional force able to support the ambitions from the Lisbon meetings was however 
never fully built up. Instead NATO took to the strategy of Massive Retaliation, implemented 
in late1954.40  Initially Norway supported Massive Retaliation as it was seen to strengthen 
NATO’s ability to deter aggression, and thus increase the importance and position of the 
alliance.41  
SACEUR anticipated that in a major conflict the first phase – the air war – would be decisive. 
The air war would consist of nuclear weapon deliveries by parties in the conflict, and with 
parallel fighting over air superiority.42 In order to maximize the effect of strategic bombing, it 
would be necessary to do reconnaissance both pre- and post-strike, and to use fighter-bombers 
in support of the strategic nuclear missions. The Norwegian DoD established a committee, led 
by Jens Boyesen, to evaluate what the new strategy would mean for Norway. One of the 
committee conclusions was that the best way to deal with the enemy would be to attack his 
bases. It is noteworthy that regarding combat effectiveness the committee prioritised quality 
before quantity. Consequently the committee did not support the proposal from the military 
leadership for setting up two more fighter squadrons. According to the Boyesen Committee 
the RNoAF should be equipped with better aircraft and better weapon systems. Simply buying 
more aircraft was not necessarily the best solution. Although advocating modernisation of the 
armed forces, the Boyesen Committee avoided addressing the question of nuclear weapons for 
                                                 
38
 Ibid p. 113. Duvsete refers to a report from MAAG, Oslo to JAMAAG in London, titled ’Activity Report, Air 
Force Section, MAAG, Norway, December 1954’. 
39
 Ibid pp. 81-83. In 1949 the Defence Study Group of 1946 [Forsvarskommisjonen av 1946 (FK 46)], led by 
Trygve Bratteli (later Prime Minister, Labour), presented its plan for the build-up of the Norwegian Armed 
Forces in the period 1949-55.  
40
 NATO: MC 48, A report on the most pattern of NATO strength for the next few years military (November 22, 
1954). See for instance p. 3, where it is stated that the Soviets must be convinced that they cannot quickly 
overrun Europe and that in the event of aggression they will be subjected immediately to devastating counter-
attack employing atomic weapons. 
41
 Kjetil Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 4, 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004), pp. 167-71. 
42
 Svein Duvsete, Luftforsvarets Historie, 3 vols (Oslo: Aschehoug & Co, 2004), p. 85 
 14 
Norway.43 The Joint Chiefs of Staff,44 established as the top leadership of the Armed Forces 
along with the removal of the position of Chief of Defence in 1946, had a quite different view 
and stated that in our current situation, with regard to conventional forces and small chances 
of getting help directly, tactical nuclear weapons are a necessity for Norwegian Armed 
Forces.45 
These issues were naturally also discussed within and among the Air Force, the Army and the 
Navy. Should one conduct offensive operations on enemy territory, or should the RNoAF 
prioritise more defensive tasks, for instance operations in (more or less direct) support of its 
own Army and Navy forces? Lieutenant General Lambrechts, Chief of the RNoAF 1951-55, 
viewed defence against enemy air attacks as the most important task. In February 1955 
Lambrechts expressed his view on the best way to achieve such a defence, and stated that 
Norwegian fighters should conduct offensive operations against targets in the Soviet Union 
and hit the enemy at his bases before he can release his full attack potential.46 This would 
contribute to keeping Norwegian airfields open for 1-2 weeks; which was considered to be 
sufficient window of opportunity for allied air forces to arrive. Lambrechts’s successor as 
Chief of the RNoAF, Lieutenant General Motzfeldt, shared Lambrechts’s view. Not 
surprisingly the Chief of the Army argued the need for direct air support of the Army’s 
operations, claiming that the RNoAF put too much weight on offensive operations. Neither 
the Chief of the Navy was pleased with air force priorities, and argued that the fleet of 
maritime patrol aircraft not only needed modernization; it should also be increased from 6 to 
18 aircraft.47 Nevertheless, the Air Force generals maintained their position on the matter.  
 
Parallel with the introduction of Massive Retaliation, Prime Minister Torp (Labour) and his 
government planned for a change in Norwegian policy which would forbid foreign bases in 
Norway in peacetime, a policy declared in February 1949. However, the government’s plan 
was never realized.48 The US presented the so-called Nash-offer, an arrangement involving 
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the stationing of 20-25 US fighter aircraft in Norway, but on regular rotation. As another 
option the US could also offer more aircraft to the RNoAF through the weapon aid 
programme, provided that the RNoAF would establish three extra fighter squadrons. In 1954 
RNoAF generals Lambrechts and Tufte Johnsen, wanting all-weather capable (AWX) fighters 
(the F-86K) instead of day-only fighters, presented an altered plan to the DoD, which partially 
agreed to the proposal.49 However, it was soon clear that the Nash-offer did not include AWX 
fighters. Norway thus received 50 F-86Fs, and in addition one squadron of RF-84F 
reconnaissance aircraft. In 1955 the defence budgets were reduced by the new government, 
and the expansion plans put on hold. The new aircraft received from the US therefore became 
a straight forward replacement of the old ones; F-86Fs replaced F-84Gs. Although the new 
reconnaissance squadron arguably represented an expansion, the RNoAF fighter fleet was in 
reality modernised rather than enlarged.  
 
The NATO document MC 70 indicated a force goal of a minimum 193 fighter aircraft for the 
RNoAF in the period 1958-63.50 In March 1958 the MAAG in Oslo signalled that they were 
considering making a delivery of some 140 aircraft to the RNoAF in 1962.51 As it turned out 
the actual delivery of fighter aircraft counted 115. In the same period Norway took to a more 
reserved view of Massive Retaliation, as well as nuclear weapons. Regarding Massive 
Retaliation the Joint Chiefs of Staff already in 1956 argued that the risk of local and limited 
attacks, or smaller scale conflict or war, was not properly addressed in the doctrine.52 In 1959 
Chief of Staff General Øen again pointed out that the NATO plans took into consideration 
little else than the possibility of an all-out war, and voiced the need for plans that addressed 
alternatives. On the issue of nuclear weapons Norway took an even more rigorous stance. At 
the NATO meeting in Paris in 1957 Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen (Labour) announced the 
Norwegian policy was not to allow nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil in peacetime, a policy 
that was reaffirmed in Parliament four years later.53  
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The 1960s – rising need for modernisation 
NATO strategy gradually changed from the early 1960s. Several factors contributed to this. In 
the USA critics claimed that Massive Retaliation no longer served US interests, and in Europe 
scepticism increased about whether the USA would go to an all-out war in response to a 
Soviet attack on any of the European NATO members. On 20 April 1961 the US National 
Security Council issued the National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 40, which set 
forth US policy toward NATO. NSAM 40 stated that the US should urge that first priority be 
given, in NATO programs for the European area, to preparing for the more likely 
contingencies, i.e., those short of nuclear or massive nonnuclear attack.54 After the French 
withdrawal from the integrated command structure of the alliance in 1966 a doctrinal change 
could finally be agreed upon, and Flexible Response was adopted by NATO in December 
1967.55 With MC 14/3 (1968)56  and MC 48/3 (1969)57 the time of Massive Retaliation was 
over, and the key feature of the new NATO strategy was not just flexibility [...] but [also] the 
idea of escalation.58   
However, NATO’s plans for how Europe would actually be defended had gradually become 
more and more flexible since the beginning of the 1960s. Already in 1962 SACEUR 
introduced alternative plans for dealing with aggression short of all-out war.59 When Flexible 
Response was formally adopted by NATO in 1967, this merely brought the overall doctrine in 
line with the plans on how to defend Europe, rather than the opposite.  
Norway was in favour of the change to Flexible Response, as it gave more room for planning 
and preparations aimed at dealing with tense situations and conflict short of all-out (nuclear) 
war. However, the RNoAF was in need of modernisation going into the 1960s, and so were 
the Army and the Navy. Much of the equipment received through the MDAP was now both 
worn out and obsolete. The new Minister of Defence as of February 1961, Gudmund Harlem, 
quickly made changes in order to meet the upcoming challenges.60 The Chief of Staff was 
given increased responsibilities; for one he was put in charge of coordinating all defence plans 
(thus far submitted “un-coordinated” directly from the Chief of the Army, Navy and Air 
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Force) before presenting them to the DoD. As of August 1961 the Chief of Staff was given 
full operational command over all national forces in peace and war, and on 1 January 1963 the 
title Chief of Defence (CoD) was formally reinstated.  Harlem also directed an increased 
effort in getting standardized material and simplified routines across the Services.61 Finally, in 
January 1962, Harlem requested a new five-year plan for the Armed Forces. Harlem acted in 
full understanding with the Americans. During a meeting between Harlem and the US 
Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara in March 1962, the Americans expressed that they 
supported the development of a purely conventional defence, which would have an increased 
focus on national tasks, especially on fighting enemy invasion in north Norway.62 The new 
five-year plan, Stortingsmelding 84, was presented to Parliament in June 1963. The three 
main tasks of the Armed Forces were defined as (1) To conduct efficient surveillance and 
early-warning, (2) To provide the strongest possible resistance against invasion, and (3) To 
secure the best possible conditions for receiving allied help.63     
 
In an RNoAF modernization plan presented in 1959 it had been suggested that the RNoAF 
should acquire 144 new fighter aircraft by 1961; all of them F-104Gs. However at the 
beginning of the 1960s the Americans believed several European countries were now able to 
finance much of their defence spending themselves. The MDAP would soon come to an end, 
and a modernization of the RNoAF fighter fleet could not be expected to be financed by the 
USA. The modernization plan thus seemed unrealistic as it was not likely that several 
squadrons of sophisticated F-104Gs would be delivered to the RNoAF.  
However, the Americans considered it to be in their own interest to continue to deliver 
defence equipment to Norway through the MDAP. The reasons were twofold: Norway was 
viewed as important to US security because Soviet air attacks against the USA would most 
likely pass through Norwegian air space. In addition it was perceived, based on American 
analyses, that with ice-free Norwegian harbours in Soviet hands, the effectiveness of the 
Soviet fleet of submarines could increase by as much as 40%. In a meeting between 
McNamara and Harlem in Athens, May 1962, it was implied that Norway would receive 
defence material worth approximately 40 million dollars in the period 1962-67, on two 
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conditions: Increased Norwegian defence budgets, and Norwegian acquirement of American 
fighter aircraft.64 
 
The modernization of the Air Force was indeed a question of economy. The MC 70 had set an 
RNoAF goal of 193 fighter aircraft for the period 1958-63. However, most modern aircraft 
were complex and thus expensive to run. For instance, if all of these new fighters were to be 
F-104Gs the annual RNoAF budget would have to be increased by 120% - just to run the 
fleet. Even if the aircraft had been received at no cost, the RNoAF could not afford to fly 
them.65 The RNoAF was originally offered 36 F-104Gs, enough to set up two squadrons. 
However, the Norwegian DoD had an alternative plan, and proposed that the RNoAF should 
receive only one squadron of F-104Gs. The value of the second squadron – some NOK 210 
million - could instead be spent on less expensive fighter-bombers. Harlem discussed the 
matter with McNamara in March 1963, who agreed.66 The same issue was on the agenda in a 
meeting between Harlem and RNoAF Lieutenant General Wilhelm Mohr later in the spring of 
1963.67 Mohr was well aware of the budgetary situation, as well as the Norwegian policy on 
nuclear weapons. The F-104G was an AWX capable fighter able to carry both conventional 
and nuclear weapons, and it was also viewed as a state-of-the art interceptor. Mohr regarded 
the F-104G as an excellent nuclear deterrent, but not cost effective if this potential would not 
be exploited.68 Mohr therefore wanted to look into the possibilities of acquiring more aircraft 
of a less sophisticated type. From a military standpoint a minimum of 100 fighter-bombers 
were required, and these would – in lieu of the low numbers of AWX capable fighters –have 
to be capable as day-only fighters / interceptors. However, the political view was that 60 
fighter-bombers would do, partially based on financial aspects, but also on an anticipation that 
allied air forces would quickly come to Norway’s aid if need be. As chief of the RNoAF, 
Mohr never acknowledged the latter to be an appropriate input to the planning of the structure 
of national forces.69  
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As it turned out the national long term plan for the period 1964-68  stated that the RNoAF 
would get 3 new squadrons with a total of 60 fighter-bombers, with possibly a fourth 
squadron added later in the period. The number of F-104Gs would be limited.70 Eventually 
the RNoAF came to operate a total of 19 F-104Gs from 1963 and on, initially replacing the F-
86F.  In the first years of its service the main wartime role of the F-104Gs was thus to fly as 
fighter-bombers.  
All weather capable fighters for north Norway 
Towards the end of the 1950s plans had been made to establish an AWX capable fighter 
squadron in north Norway. The reason for this was increased Soviet air activity; of which 
approximately one third was all-weather operations. The lack of an AWX capability was of 
concern on a national level as well as in NATO.71 Late in 1960 the F-86Fs at Bodø Airbase 
were replaced by F-86Ks. The K model had radar, and the primary mission was to fly as an 
AWX air defence fighter. In addition, for the purpose of air policing, the F-86K squadron was 
also responsible for maintaining Ground Alert with two (and in periods four) aircraft. The F-
86K had limited range and endurance, and the typical sortie length would be 45-60 minutes. 
The sortie could however be considerably shorter, even halved, depending on the need for low 
level flying or use of the afterburner. The lack of speed in dry power in many cases forced use 
of the afterburner, significantly reducing endurance and severely hampering the successful 
completion of interceptions.72   
The F-104Gs were delivered under the MDAP, and the Americans were consulted before the 
role of the aircraft was changed. After a meeting between Harlem and McNamara in the fall 
of 1967 it was clear that the 331 squadron and the F-104Gs in Bodø would be used as AWX 
fighters in wartime, and the change to the new role came into effect as of October. 73 In 
peacetime the main role for the squadron would be Air Policing. The squadron was placed 
under the command of Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Northern Europe (CINCNORTH), 
and as of 1 November the squadron had two aircraft on Ground Alert day and night, ready to 
air police on scramble orders.  
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The purchase of the F-5 and the NDRE 
In 1962 it had become clear that the F-86 fighter-bombers were not only outdated, they were 
also in poor condition. Temporary technical modifications for parts of the fleet helped to some 
degree, but in the long term new fighter-bombers would have to be acquired. This would be 
the first national purchase of fighter-bombers since the Vampire in 1948; then based on 
technical analyses, cost assessments and test flying performed by the RNoAF alone. The 
method selected in 1962 was quite similar, but in addition the RNoAF also wanted a scientific 
approach.74 The job would go to the NDRE. 
Norway had no own defence research establishment prior to WW II. However during the war 
Norwegian civilian scientists and engineers were engaged in British military research 
activity.75 When the NDRE was formally established 11 April 1946, the core of the new 
organisation consisted of scientists and engineers with British experience. Although the 
NDRE took on the task of giving advice on defence related science and technology from the 
start, the efforts in this field were modest during the first years. But towards the end of the 
1950s changes were made in order to organize and improve the field. In the book “Kunnskap 
som våpen” Olav Njølstad and Olav Wicken describe the establishment of the System Group 
in 1959 as a turning point for the better.76 One year later Parliament put the NDRE in charge 
of all defence related operations research and system analyses.77   
The RNoAF contacted the NDRE System Group in fall 1962. The System Group spent half a 
year on the analysis ‘A limited Effectiveness/Cost study of Fighter-bombers’, with the 
intention of assisting the RNoAF in the evaluation of fighter aircraft in missions involving 
attack on surface targets.78 The effectiveness of seven different aircraft was studied, with two 
main types of missions taken into consideration. One was the penetration of enemy territory 
and attack on radar installations in support of allied nuclear strike missions; i.e. SNOWCAT 
missions. The other was attack against invading enemy sea and ground forces, with both sides 
using only conventional weapons. These two main mission types were combined with 
different types of targets and ranges from the home base, resulting in a number of specific 
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missions. The MoE used for each type was simply set to be the average number of targets 
destroyed by a squadron.79 No doubt was left regarding the necessity of the fighter-bomber in 
case of an invasion, as it was stated in the study’s introduction that in an initial invasion 
defence of Norwegian territory short term reduction of enemy tactical fighting strength on 
land must have high priority. Wherever possible enemy ground forces should be engaged by 
fighter-bombers before they reach the battle area and are able to inflict losses on our army 
units80. Average annual costs figures per squadron were established so that the 
effectiveness/cost calculations could be made. The cost figures included all initial investments 
as well as operating costs, varying with the number of squadrons. One squadron was set up 
with 21 pilots and 18 aircraft. Life expectancy for one aircraft was set to ten years with 240 
flying hours per year.  
The F-86F and F-84F were both excluded early due to the age of these aircraft […]. 81 Of the 
remaining five aircraft the F-104G was ranked last. It was the most expensive candidate, and 
was also restricted in its ability to carry conventional stores due to few stations for external 
weapons and fuel tanks. The Fiat G-91 was ranked as number four. It was the cheapest of the 
candidates, but rather limited in range and weapon carriage capability. 82  The three top 
candidates were from first to third place the Douglas A4D-5, the Northrop F-5A and the 
Lockheed F-104 -17 (or just F-104H). The latter was basically the same aircraft as the F-
104G, but without the more complex electronic systems, such as radar and inertial navigation 
system. The F-104H would therefore be cheaper than the F-104G. However, both the A4D-5 
and the F-5A were preferred over the F-104H in the fighter-bomber role, with the A4D-5 
ranked highest.  
American analyses gave similar results. But in fall 1963 a new and important aspect emerged. 
As the RNoAF would receive only one squadron of F-104Gs, it was decided that the new 
fighter-bomber would be assigned the secondary role of air policing, air defence and 
reconnaissance. The chief of the RNoAF decided that the F-104H was to be part of the final 
evaluation and test flight programme. The NDRE findings were verified, as the A4D-5 
performed best in the fighter-bomber role. However, the F-104H was by far the best air 
defence candidate. Although the F-5A was found inferior to the A4D-5 and the F-104H in 
roles of fighter-bomber and air defence respectively, it delivered decent results in both roles. 
Overall the Norwegian team considered the F-5A to be the best candidate. General Major 
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Mohr, at the time leading the RNoAF Staff, also preferred the F-5A.83  The F-5A was 
recommended by the RNoAF as the new fighter-bomber aircraft, and in February 1964 the 
government decided to purchase 64 F-5s.84 The RNoAF came to operate a total of 108 F-5 
aircraft.85 
 
The RNoAF was quite pleased with the cooperation with the NDRE. The scientific analysis 
and report complemented the RNoAF analysis. In addition the NDRE was considered by 
political decision makers to be an independent research institution. The RNoAF therefore 
found the NDRE to be a very important partner. In an interview in May 2000 General Major 
Mohr stated that we saw the NDRE as very useful to us…they said it all so much better, and 
had access to circles we could not reach.86   
SNOWCAT - typical offensive tasks  
The most illustrative offensive tasks of the RNoAF fighter fleet in the 1950s and 1960s were 
the SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Attacks) missions. 
RNoAF fighter-bombers would attack pre-planned targets with conventional weapons, and 
reconnaissance fighters would carry out both pre- and post-attack reconnaissance. The aim of 
these operations was twofold. The foremost goal was to destroy Soviet radar antenna and 
communication nodes, and thereby deny the enemy early warning and reduce his ability to 
control and direct forces against NATO operations. Secondly, the aim was to contribute to an 
overload in the Soviet command and control systems, thereby preventing the enemy from 
figuring out which of the many incoming NATO aircraft were carrying nuclear weapons and 
thus unable to stop NATO nuclear bombers from striking their targets. The latter has been 
seen as perhaps the most important effect of the SNOWCAT missions.87  
 
The SNOWCAT missions were introduced in 1956. The mission targets, picked by 
CINCNORTH, were located in the Soviet Union, East-Germany, Poland and the Baltic states. 
In addition plans were made for attacking targets in Finland, but these missions were not to be 
carried out until it was clear that enemy forces were preparing to make use of Finnish bases. 
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The practical planning of the missions, including the routing, was done by Norwegian 
personnel. The SNOWCAT missions involved the use of F-84Gs, F-86Fs and F-5As. 
Limitations in combat range was an important planning issue. The limited amount of fuel 
would rule out deviation from planned routing as well as aerial engagement with enemy 
forces. SNOWCAT missions were thus in some cases seen as one-way missions, with an 
anticipation that several units might end their mission with an emergency landing on (or 
ejection over) foreign territory.  
SNOWCAT missions would primarily support SACEUR`s nuclear strike plans. However, in 
the event of a broad offensive air campaign the SNOWCAT missions would function as a 
door-opener not only for strike forces under NATO command, but all air forces (for instance 
the US Strategic Air Command or the RAF Bomber Command) with strike missions in the 
same area. From 1959 NATO plans for the Norwegian air forces in north Norway showed that 
support of CINCNORTHs Atomic Strike Plan (ASP) was prioritised higher than the defence 
of Norwegian territory against Soviet invasion. This triggered discussions on a national 
military level. Should one suggest a change to the NATO prioritisation of the tasks; or should 
one call for a transfer of the authority to alter the prioritisation to a Norwegian General? In 
1959 the Commander of Northern Norway (ØKN), Skule Storheil, suggested that such an 
authority should be delegated to him. But the plans for 1960 reflected the same priorities. No 
changes were made, and it was with great ambivalence Norwegian military commanders 
accepted that support of the ASP would have higher priority than the defence against an 
invasion, and that the authority to re-allocate the Norwegian forces would be in the hands of 
CINCNORTH.88  
Norwegian political authorities were not enthusiastic about the SNOWCAT missions. In 
March 1956 Prime Minister Gerhardsen expressed his aversion to the use of Norwegian 
aircraft in offensive missions over Soviet territory.89 His comments were based on principle; 
the RNoAF should primarily be used for the direct defence of Norwegian territory and people. 
However; despite the scepticism towards the SNOWCAT missions, Norwegian political 
authorities never put a stop to it. In fact, the use of Norwegian aircraft for offensive missions 
inside another country’s airspace was in an indirect manner approved by Parliament in 
Stortingsmelding 77, the five-year plan for the structuring and tasks of the RNoAF in the 
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period 1964-68, presented in April 1964.90 On page 2 it is stated that in conducting offensive 
operations with fighter-bombers the primary goal is to attack enemy forces before they force 
their way into our own areas.91 Possible targets are listed, including airports and installations 
at airports, aircraft on the ground, radar sites and communication nodes. To attack such 
targets, before the enemy could get to our own areas, would have required offensive missions 
into Soviet territory.  
 
SNOWCAT missions had first priority for assigned squadrons until the end of the 60s. In 
1970 the concept was discussed among CINCNORTHs Air Commanders. Going into the 
1970s the use of the fighter aircraft in exercises changed; direct support of anti-invasion 
would now have priority over SNOWCAT missions. SNOWCAT missions slowly 
disappeared from the plans, and by the middle of the 1970s the last plans were gone.92    
Chapter 2 in perspective 
The three-year plan for the rebuilding of Norway’s armed forces, issued by the DoD in 1946, 
stated that Norwegian Armed Forces had to be able ‘to stand our ground until we get help 
from those who will be our allies’. Norway joined NATO in 1949, but announced the same 
year the policy of not allowing foreign forces bases in Norway in peacetime.   
Although national defence budgets were increased in the early 50s, huge defence investments 
in the period 1950-1965 were financed by the USA and NATO. Through the 1950s and well 
into the 1960s the RNoAF operated a fighter fleet of nearly four hundred F-84s and F-86s. 
These aircraft were true workhorses of their day; primarily intended for use as fighter-
bombers carrying out offensive missions. SNOWCAT missions, supporting nuclear strike 
missions on Soviet and WP territory, are the most illustrative offensive missions for RNoAF 
fighter-bombers in the period. These missions had first priority for assigned squadrons until 
the end of the 60s. In 1955 Air Force General Lambrechts stated that conducting offensive 
fighter missions against targets on enemy territory, thus hitting ‘the enemy at his bases before 
he can release his full attack potential’, would contribute to keeping Norwegian airfields open 
for 1-2 weeks. Such was considered to be sufficient window of opportunity for allied air 
                                                 
90
 Stortingsmelding nr 77 (1963-64), Luftforsvarets styrkemålsetting i perioden 1964-1968, (Oslo: FD, 24. april 
1964). See also Kjetil Skogrand og Rolf Tamnes, Fryktens likevekt – atombomben, Norge og verden 1945-1970, 
(Oslo: Tiden Norsk Forlag AS, 2001), p. 204. 
91
 Stortingsmelding nr 77 (1963-64), Luftforsvarets styrkemålsetting i perioden 1964-1968, (Oslo: FD, 24. april 
1964), p.2. Original text: [Det primære mål er å kunne angripe fiendens styrker før disse har trengt inn i våre 
egne forsvarsområder]. 
92
 Kjetil Skogrand og Rolf Tamnes, Fryktens likevekt – atombomben, Norge og verden 1945-1970, (Oslo: Tiden 
Norsk Forlag AS, 2001), p. 205. Squadrons 336 and 338 were the last two squadrons with plans for SNOWCAT.  
 25 
forces to arrive. However, in 1956 the Joint Chiefs argued that the risk of limited attacks, or 
smaller scale conflict or war, was not properly addressed in the doctrine of Massive 
Retaliation. Nonetheless, the same year the Joint Chiefs stated that ‘in our current situation, 
with regard to conventional forces and small chances of getting help directly, tactical nuclear 
weapons are a necessity for Norwegian Armed Forces’. However, shortly thereafter Prime 
Minister Gerhardsen (Labour) announced the Norwegian policy not to allow nuclear weapons 
on Norwegian soil in peacetime. 
In 1959 Chief of Staff General Øen again pointed out that the NATO plans took into 
consideration little else than the possibility of an all-out war, and voiced the need for plans 
that addressed alternatives. It seems clear that going into the 1960s both political and military 
levels increasingly favoured Flexible Response. It was at the same time evident that the 
weapons aid programmes were coming to an end. However, in the case of Norway the 
Americans considered it to be in their own interest to continue to deliver defence equipment a 
while longer, based on the view that Soviet air attacks against the US would most likely pass 
through Norwegian air space. This combined well with Norwegian ambitions to acquire a 
certain air defence capability; a capability that in fact was viewed to be important throughout 
the period. It was the Boyesen Committee that had voiced the strongest preferences with 
regard to air defence fighter squadrons, but also the RNoAF saw the need for a certain air 
defence capability.  From 1960 onwards, increasing Soviet air activity caused concern both on 
the national level and in NATO, resulting in more focus on using fighters in an air defence 
role in north Norway. This seems to have helped pave the way for getting AWX Air Policing 
fighters stationed in Bodø; first the F-86Ks in 1960, and three years later the F-104 Starfighter 
(also delivered under the MDAP).  
Continued US weapon aid was given under the conditions that Norway increase her defence 
budgets, and purchase US fighters. In 1963 a new five-year plan, Stortingsmelding 84, was 
presented. The three main tasks of the Armed Forces were to conduct efficient surveillance 
and early-warning, to provide the strongest possible resistance against invasion, and to secure 
the best possible conditions for receiving allied help. At the same time the NDRE System 
Group, after having been contacted by the RNoAF, carried out the analysis ‘A limited 
Effectiveness/Cost study of Fighter-bombers’. The aim was to assist the RNoAF in evaluating 
fighter aircraft in missions involving attack on surface targets. The study’s introduction stated 
that ‘in an initial invasion defence of Norwegian territory short term reduction of enemy 
tactical fighting strength on land must have high priority. Wherever possible enemy ground 
forces should be engaged by fighter-bombers before they reach the battle area and are able to 
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inflict losses on our army units’. The MoE for each of the two main mission types, 
SNOWCAT missions and attack against invading enemy sea and ground forces respectively, 
were set to be ‘the average number of targets destroyed by a squadron’. Not only did the 
NDRE analysis complement the RNoAF analysis, the NDRE was also well regarded as an 
independent research institution by political authorities, and was therefore viewed as an 
important ally.  
 
Summed up it is clear that throughout this period national defence planning was heavily based 
on the idea that Norway would not be able to defend herself. Strong allies were therefore of 
great importance. Norway joined NATO, and was initially in support of Massive Retaliation. 
Nevertheless, at the same time political authorities did not permit foreign forces permanent 
basing in Norway or nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil in peacetime. Into the 1960s Norway 
increasingly favoured Flexible Response, and looked more to the Soviet threat in the north 
and the need for certain air defence capabilities. Nonetheless; the prioritisation of an offensive 
use of the fighter fleet was upheld; even though it seemingly stemmed more from NATO 
doctrine and plans, and the type and amount of aircraft received through the MDAP, rather 
than being the result of decision on Norway’s part. In addition the 1964 decision (supported 
by the NDRE F-5 study) to buy fighter-bombers, the priority to SNOWCAT missions 
throughout the 1960s and the renewed RNoAF doctrine of 1969 all underpin the same picture: 




3 The NDRE System Group, The threat, and the Conflict 
Scenario 
 
The NDRE, the NDRE System Group, and Operations Research & 
System Analysis  
The NDRE, led by a civilian Director General and located at Kjeller near Oslo, was organised 
directly under the DoD from its inception in 1946. Over the years the NDRE experienced 
considerable growth, both in budgets and manning. In 1946 the institution employed 
approximately 50 people, with a budget equivalent to 0.5 % of the defence budget. By the end 
of the 1960s the budget was 1.1 %, and total manning more than 500.93 The primary task of 
the NDRE was to carry out defence related research, and to advise on defence related science 
and technology.  
In the late 1950s a reorganisation of the NDRE was initiated. The main aim was to strengthen 
the Director General and his ability to direct research activities.94 Thus, the System Group 
was established in 1959. The NDRE’s efforts in providing advice on defence related science 
and technology had been modest during the first years. With the System Group, organised 
directly under the Director General, this was now to change. NDRE Director General Finn 
Lied had ambitions for the new Systems Group beyond Operations Research limited to the 
field of weapon systems, and more in the direction of broad Systems Analysis aimed at finding 
optimum use of resources on various levels in the Armed Forces.95  
Lied selected Erik Klippenberg as the first leader for the NDRE System Group, a position he 
held until 1984. Klippenberg had experience with Operations Research (OR) and Systems 
Analysis (SA) from the SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre (SADTC) in the Hague.  From 
its establishment the System Group used OR and SA as tools to provide a basis for planning 
and decisions on different levels within the Armed Forces.96 The System Group was central in 
strengthening the position of the NDRE as chief adviser to the DoD and the Armed Forces on 
defence related matters, and also in underpinning the NDRE as a vital contributor in defence 
planning.  
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According to the Canadian scientist Omond Solandt97 OR started as a more or less formal 
British concern early in WWII, with the different services covering different subjects. For 
instance in the Air Force, the first of the services to use OR, quantitative analysis was applied 
to solve the problem of how to use the radar. In the book ‘Methods of Operations Research’ 
OR is defined as a scientific method of providing executive departments with a quantitative 
basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control.98 Clayton J Thomas has 
stated that the general methods of OR apply in particular to many aspects of military 
operations, and thus defines Military Operations Research (MOR) as the application to 
military operations of the methods of operations research. 99 MOR became a highly valued 
method of analyzing a wide range of military activities in order to promote greater efficiency 
during WWII. After the war, scientific study of military operations such as MOR became 
widespread and institutionalized. As the Cold War emerged, there was a general recognition 
that it would be necessary to increase the use of MOR, devoted not only to combat operations, 
but also in the fields of supply, logistics, training and more.  
 
Even in the Cold War climate there were limits on national expenditures for armed forces.  
Problems soon involved more than that of merely maximizing the effect of individual weapon 
systems. In Thomas’ words governments needed to decide “how much is enough”, and MOR 
sought to support this decision. Application of operations research at this level – termed 
Systems Analysis (SA) – involves difficulties much greater than difficulties of, for instance, 
MOR in WWII. For a quick look into what SA is, the article ‘An Appreciation of Systems 
Analysis’ by Charles Hitch, RAND Cooperation is very helpful. It states that military systems 
analysis is an extension of operations research techniques of WWII to problems of broader 
context and longer range – e.g. force composition and development […]. 100 Hitch points out 
that composition and development decisions concern a military force ten to fifteen years in 
the future, and maintains that this alone causes a substantial increase in the number of 
interdependent variables which have to be considered. Hitch, who in a later article examined 
more in depth what he considered to be the most intractable problems of OR,101 illustrates his 
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point by comparing the WWII problem of improving bomber accuracy with the post-war 
problems of weapon system development and force composition. In the short run [i.e. the 
WWII problem], Hitch argues, much would be given, but in the longer run the situation would 
be different: The planes were B-17’s, their number was given, the targets were given, the 
bombs were given, the enemy defenses were given [...]. In the longer run these are not given. 
They are unknown. They become variables.102  However, in Thomas’ words, despite these 
difficulties, governments must make decisions, and Systems Analysis, with all of its 
limitations, has much to offer.103  
In 1960 the Norwegian Parliament decided that the NDRE would be the leading institution for 
defence planning decisions.104 The Army and the Air Force were content with this, but there 
had been disagreements on the matter between the NDRE and the Navy. In 1957 the Chief of 
the Navy Statistic Unit stated that his unit from now on would conduct all Navy related OR. 
Though the Navy and the NDRE eventually found a middle ground,105 the Navy kept on 
educating officers in OR at the US Naval Postgraduate School. 
In 1967 Klippenberg clarified what OR and SA meant at the NDRE.106 OR were analyses of 
operations involving existing material, weapon systems and/or military personnel. The goal 
would primarily be to evaluate either alternative products, or to find an optimum way of using 
already implemented material or weapon systems. Also the term SA was used to describe 
defined studies. SA primarily aimed at finding an optimum configuration of a defence system 
intended for one or more of the Services; carefully observing the amount of defence resources 
available for implementing and running the system in question. Moreover, to the extent the 
use of simulations and OR allowed, SA was also aimed at recommending guidelines for the 
most effective use of the system(s) in question.107 
 
OR, SA and quantitative methods were the main tools for the NDRE in providing a 
foundation for its decisions in defence planning. As the 1960s went by the demand for this 
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increased. There were several reasons for this.108 The US weapon aid programme was coming 
to an end, whilst several of the Norwegian Services’ weapon systems were becoming 
obsolete. In addition prices on defence related material and systems had been increasing 
drastically. In 1967 Director General Lied reported to the DoD that while true-value growth in 
the defence budgets has been some 30 – 50 % in the past decade, the prices for new and 
sophisticated weapon systems has increased much more sharply; for example the prices for 
new fighters have increased with some 300%.109  It would be essential to make the coming 
defence investments as cost effective as possible. Authors of the NDRE History (1997) 
Njølstad and Wicken commend Lied and Klippenberg for having realized at such an early 
stage that the changes to the economical situation would create an almost inexhaustible need, 
both on political and military levels, for quantitative cost-effectiveness calculations as basis 
for decisions regarding future defence investments and disposition of forces.110  
National threat assessments 
From 1947-48 and onward, national authorities viewed the Soviet Union as the primary threat 
to Norway. Some vital lessons had been drawn from WWII.111  In particular one feared being 
attacked the same way as in 1940; a surprise attack aimed at paralyzing the authorities, 
preventing mobilisation and an organised defence from being mounted. Unlike the interwar 
period it was no longer thought that Norway could avoid being involved in case of war 
between the great powers, and it was assumed that the goal of an attacking enemy would be to 
invade and occupy Norway (or at least part of it). Above all it was generally acknowledged 
that Norway would not be able to defend herself alone.  
For some time it was thought that a Soviet attack could be launched against both southern and 
northern Norway. But, based on the general development and strengthening of NATOs atomic 
strike capabilities, and the build-up of West German conventional forces, focus on the 
northern region gradually became more dominant. A Soviet attack on southern Norway 
without first gaining control of West Germany and Denmark was considered unlikely. The 
densely populated parts of Norway were thus considered to be better off. It has been argued 
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that such a view was underpinned by the fact that West Germany asked to establish bases and 
hospitals in southern Norway.112  
A Soviet attack on the northernmost parts of Norway, the counties of Finnmark and Troms, 
was not an entirely new scenario. In the Medium Term Defence Plan, as part of adopting the 
principle of forward defence, NATO had set forth the plan that in the north the alliance would 
aim to stop a Soviet attack in the Lyngen area in Troms.113 In addition, as both the geographic 
area and the enemy were the same, one could also look to the experiences of German forces 
during WWII.  Finnmark, bordering the Soviet Union and Finland, is relatively flat and 
presents few natural difficulties for an advancing mechanised force. Thus the Lyngen area, 
based on its topography, was considered to be the first line of defence that would favour an 
inferior defending force trying to halt an invading enemy from the east. Parallel with the 
military land-based focus on the area of inner Troms, Bodø in Nordland (south of Troms) was 
given a similar focus regarding air forces. During the 1950s Bodø Airbase was designated as a 
main airbase and set up with two fighter squadrons, partly because Bardufoss Airbase (some 
30 nm west of Lyngen) would be exposed to enemy air attacks, and partly because Bodø 
probably would be a suitable area for receiving allied reinforcements. In the 1960s several 
scenarios involving somewhat limited Soviet attacks against north Norway were developed. 
Figure 1 shows a map with six different scenarios, all of them involving occupation of 
Norwegian territory.114  
                                                 
112
 Ibid p. 38. 
113
 Kjetil Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 4, 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004), p. 38 
114
 Ibid p. 43 
 32 
Figure 1. Source: Skogrand/Forsvarshistorien bind 4.  
 
Alternative 1 represents Soviet seizure of a limited area east of Neiden, while alternative 2 is a 
mere take-over of one or more towns and/or islands along the coast. Alternatives 3 through 6 
represent progressively more ambitious Soviet attacks and the occupation of increasingly 
more territory in Finnmark and Troms. In time it was thought, both on national levels and in 
NATO, that a limited Soviet attack would at least be aimed at occupying both sides of the 
Varangerfjord, and thus advance to Tana (alternative 3). According to Skogrand the NATO 
view was that the Soviet Union would see this as an acceptable balance between achieving the 
goals of their attack and associated risks. An attack further towards the west would be 
perceived by the Soviets as too risky. In the words of Skogrand, a limited Soviet attack, with a 
quick and successful occupation of limited areas in Finnmark only, could in the worst case be 
a fait accompli.115 This would have to be avoided, and the way to do this was to engage an 
invading force immediately after border violation, thus making it clear that a NATO member 
had been attacked. To ensure a capacity to do so it would be required to have a certain amount 
of forces fielded permanently in the region. In March 1968 the government issued 
Stortingsmelding nr 37 (1967-68); ‘Main guidelines for the organisation and activities of the 
Armed Forces in the period 1969-1973’. As it was presented in the spring, Stortingsmelding 
37 did not reflect three important events, shortly to be discussed, that took place later in 1968. 
Nevertheless, Stortingsmelding 37 stated that this paper is based on the view that as all-out 
war has become less likely, it has become necessary to increase the focus on the possibility of 
smaller conflicts and their potential for escalation. This premise does not only apply to the 
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military, but also to overall defence related measures […] An attack against our territory 
will, even if it appears to be aimed only towards a limited part of our country, implies that we 
will have to fight for our existence. When planning our defence efforts it is vital that this is 
recognized.116 In an attachment the Chief of Defence (CoD) called for a general strengthening 
of the Army, with priority in Northern Norway.117   
Moreover, Stortingsmelding 37 settled that the ability to mount the strongest possible 
resistance to any kind of attack, and to prepare in the best possible way for allied assistance, 
continue to be the cornerstones of our defence efforts.118 These ambitions were in line with 
the preceding long term plan. But, on the financial side there was a call for reductions. The 
real budgetary growth in the period 1964-68 turned out to be 4 % pr year. For the period 
1969-73 the plan was for 2.5 % annual growth.119 The CoD recommended a substantial 
growth in several areas, and referring to operational demands left no doubt that he highly 
prioritised the purchase of new aircraft: With the aerial threat at hand, the tasks of the Armed 
Forces, the aim of the defence of the various parts of the country, the financial framework, the 
possibility of allied assistance and the prioritisation in-between the various elements of the 
Armed Forces, it appears that our fighter-bomber force should be increased considerably.120 
In the concluding remarks of the CoD’s five-year plan, regarding the financial side of the 
1969-73 plan, it is stated that the long term plan expresses how to achieve the best possible 
defence within a given [financial] framework. It is not an expression of a defence mass and 
volume that meet the operational needs.121  
                                                 
116
 Stortingsmelding nr 37 (1967-68), Hovedretningslinjer for Forsvarets organisasjon og virksomhet i tiden 
1969 - 1973, (Oslo: FD, 8. mars 1968), p. 7. Original text: [i denne melding er det syn lagt til grunn, at fordi 
storkrigsalternativet anses som mindre sannsynlig enn før, må en i større grad rette oppmerksomheten mot 
muligheten for begrensede konflikter og opptrapping av slike. Denne forutsetning bør bli retningsgivende ikke 
bare for det militære element, men for de ulike totalforsvarsmessige tiltak […]Et væpnet angrep mot vårt land 
vil, selv om det framstår som geografisk begrenset, bety kamp for vår eksistens. Ved planleggingen av vår 
forsvarsinnsats er det viktig at vi har klart for oss hva dette innebærer.]  
117
 Ibid. Vedlegg: ’Forsvarssjefens uttalelse til de foreslåtte hovedretningslinjer for forsvaret i tiden 1969-1973’, 
pp. 54-55. 
118
 Ibid p. 31. Original text: [å kunne yte sterkest mulig motstand mot enhver form for angrep og å legge 
forholdene best mulig til rette for alliert hjelp må derfor fortsatt utgjøre hjørnestenene i vår forsvarsinnsats]. 
119
 Ibid p. 33. 
120
 Ibid. Vedlegg: ’Forsvarssjefens uttalelse til de foreslåtte hovedretningslinjer for forsvaret i tiden 1969-1973’, 
p. 58. Original text: [ved å sammenholde lufttrusselen, Forsvarets oppgaver, målsetting for forsvarsstriden i de 
enkelte landsdeler, den økonomiske ramme, muligheten for alliert hjelp og forsvarselementenes innbyrdes 
prioritering, synes det å fremgå at vår jagerbombestyrke bør økes vesentlig]. 
121
 Ibid. Vedlegg: ’Forsvarssjefens uttalelse til de foreslåtte hovedretningslinjer for forsvaret i tiden 1969-1973’, 
p. 62. Original text: [Langtidsplanen er derfor et uttrykk for det beste forsvar man kan oppnå innen visse 
grenser. Den er ikke et uttrykk for et forsvar som i størrelse dekker de operative behov]. 
 34 
The 1968 events 
Three events in mid-1968 were viewed as particularly important at the time, both in general 
terms regarding the Soviet threat and more particularly for the situation in the north. First, as 
allied forces were arriving in north Norway to take part in exercise Polar Express in June, the 
Soviet 45th Motorized Infantry Division moved into positions along the Soviet-Norwegian 
border. A few weeks later, in July 1968, the Soviets carried out exercise ‘Sever’. This was by 
then the largest Soviet naval exercise ever observed in the north, involving more than a 
hundred vessels and supported by air forces. Finally, when Soviet troops marched into 
Czechoslovakia in August, this was also somewhat of a surprise to western analysts.122  
 
Lt. Col Aune, Chief of the Border Guard, had not received any advance information of 
possible increased Soviet activities. He was therefore taken by surprise as he got up in the 
morning with a Soviet division in position just across the border. Aune got no response to his 
reports on the matter. He therefore telephoned the Minister of Defence Otto Tidemand during 
the evening of 6 June, and asked what to do if the Soviets crossed the border. Tidemand 
simply referred to the Royal Decree of 10 June 1949, a well known decree that states that in 
case of an attack on Norway all officers, regardless of mobilisation status or whether war has 
been declared, are obliged to ensure that the enemy is engaged immediately and by all means 
available.123 Aune pointed out that this would mean war, to which the Minister plainly replied 
‘yes, it does’.124 Tidemand later explained that he feared that his telephone might be bugged, 
and that he wanted to leave no doubt what the consequences would be in case of invasion. 
The Soviet division withdrew after four days.  
Exercise ‘Sever’ was conducted in the North Atlantic, the Norwegian Sea and the Barents 
Sea, and was seen to demonstrate the capabilities of the North Fleet in intercepting western 
lines of communication across the Atlantic. However, the exercise also demonstrated Soviet 
capability in conducting amphibious operations, causing concern for the Norwegians. In 
‘Sever’ a group of Soviet amphibious vessels and destroyers sailed from the Baltic Sea all the 
                                                 
122
 Kjetil Skogrand, Norsk Forsvarshistorie Bind 4, 5 vols (Bergen: Eide forlag, 2004), p. 44. 
123
 Kongelig Resolusjon 10. juni 1949, Direktiver for militære befalingsmenn og militære sjefer ved væpnet 
angrep på Norge 
124
 Tønne Huitfeldt and Arild Hjerde, ’Sør-Varanger juni 1968 – Den Sovjetiske styrkedemonstrasjonen’, 
Forsvarsstudier 3 (2003), p. 27 
 35 
way up along the Norwegian coast. After joining up with more vessels north of Finnmark they 
launched an amphibious assault on the Kola Peninsula.125   
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was yet another small surprise to western analysts. 
The Soviet troops used for the march into Czechoslovakian territory had for some time been 
participating in an exercise in the region. It had thus far been assessed improbable that a 
Soviet exercise could be turned into a live attack.  
In sum the events in the summer of 1968 led to an increased concern that Soviet exercises 
might serve as a pretext for preparing live operations. The recently observed Soviet military 
activities were in themselves a challenge: By sailing an amphibious group close to the 
Norwegian coastline the Soviets set up a precedent for viewing this as a normal part of naval 
exercises. This would make it even more complicated to decide in the future whether an 
exercise was about to be transformed into a live operation. The Soviet deployment of a 
motorized infantry division of eleven thousand men to the Norwegian border showed how 
exercises could be exploited for political pressure. Even announced exercises, as was the case 
with ‘Sever’, could cause concern. On the one hand announcements could clear away the 
possibility for misunderstandings. On the other hand they could also be used for a variety of 
other purposes, ranging from exerting political pressure to concealing preparations for an 
attack. Also the NATO exercise Polar Express-68 was announced beforehand, and had been 
strongly criticized in the Soviet press.126 In October 1967, as the first NATO Minister of 
Defence, Otto Tidemand had visited Moscow. On the issue of allied exercises in north 
Norway his Soviet counterpart, Andrej Gretsjko, said that you are running a considerable risk 
[…].127 However, with ten thousand NATO troops in Troms, the deployment of a division to 
the Soviet-Norwegian border was seen as a demonstration of strength, and of disappointment 
with Norway for hosting large NATO exercises. An attack was not perceived likely. 
Nevertheless, shortly after the 1968 events CoD Admiral Hauger Johannessen underlined the 
capability of the Soviet forces based on the Kola Peninsula to carry out a surprise attack on 
Norway, and stressed the need for immediately establishing a clear situation of ongoing war 
fighting upon enemy invasion, as well as the ability to delay enemy advances.  
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In fall 1968, in lieu of the events of the summer, it was decided to improve the mobility of the 
Air Force and the Navy, and to improve the ability to reinforce Finnmark in case of a Soviet 
surprise attack. In addition already existing units were strengthened.128 These improvements, 
estimated to cost some NOK 100 million, were however to be covered within the ordinary 
defence budgets by altering a few already planned expenditures. In hindsight Kjetil Skogrand 
has held that the national forces were to be the trip wire which set off an allied reaction.129   
NATO’s assessment of the Soviet threat 
In 1970 NATO’s Military Committee issued MC 161/70, a three hundred page Cosmic Top 
Secret report on ‘The Soviet Bloc Strength and Capabilities’. The document was declassified 
in 2006. It covered the period of 1970-74, and aimed to provide NATO Commanders with 
intelligence guidance on which to base their defense plans and force requirements; [and] 
NATO nations with the military intelligence which is used as a basis for NATO plans.130  MC 
161/70 examined a broad variety of topics related to the Soviet Union, including campaigns 
against the Scandinavian Peninsula. 
In 1970 the Soviet air forces, including naval aviation, were assessed to have a total strength 
of 10,600 aircraft. Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (WP) air forces numbered 2,500 aircraft, adding 
up to a grand total of about 13,000 aircraft.131 Some 8,500 of these were fighter aircraft: 2,930 
Tactical Aviation, 2,200 non-Soviet and 3,310 IAPVO fighters.132  The latter would defend 
Soviet homeland only.  
The mission of Soviet Tactical Aviation (STA), by the Soviets referred to as aviation of the 
front, was to support the theatre (front) commander. 133 This included air superiority 
operations, close air support, interdiction in combination with ground force operations, strikes 
against targets of importance to the front, and air defence in the theatre of operations. STA 
aircraft were organised into Tactical Air Armies (TAAs), vested with Military Districts (MD) 
in peacetime, and in wartime with theatre commanders. TAA quality was expected to increase 
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as new aircraft (the Flogger, the Flagon B and the Foxbat) were introduced. Within the decade 
no change was expected to the total number of STA aircraft.134  
Soviet Long Range Aviation (LRA) consisted of three Air Armies, sub-divided into divisions 
and regiments. Some 900 LRA aircraft were based in European USSR.135 One of the LRA 
missions was to provide support to the fronts by attacking selected high priority targets in 
areas beyond the range of Tactical Aviation.136 In addition Soviet Naval Aviation was 
estimated to have 900 aircraft.137  The Northern Fleet Air Force had 125 heavy and medium 
bombers, 20 tankers, and 80 ASW aircraft.138 Regarding amphibious capabilities Soviet Naval 
Infantry consisted of six brigades, of which the Northern Fleet had one. One brigade with 
support functions and service companies contained approximately 2,000 men.139  
In campaigns against the Scandinavian Peninsula Soviet objectives would be to establish 
advanced bases on the coast of Norway […], deny the Allies the use of bases and facilities in 
the area […], and to extend their early warning and air defense system.140  The Northern 
Fleet, with its air force and amphibious capacity, would be able to provide direct support to 
operations in the northern area, as well as indirect support via their engagement in offensive 
operations at sea. Leningrad MD in north-western USSR had 10 divisions, of which 7 were 
ready for early commitment.141 About 115 combat aircraft, most of them designated for the 
role of ground attack, were routinely based with the 13th TAA in Leningrad MD and, 
according to MC 161/70, considered to be available for use in operations against the 
Scandinavian Peninsula. These, however, might be considered insufficient; and additional 
tactical aviation required for the Scandinavian campaign would, in that event, have to be 
drawn from other areas.142 Adjacent MDs, as for instance the Baltic and the Moscow MDs 
(both western USSR), were estimated to have a total of 215 and 190 Tactical Aviation combat 
aircraft respectively. It is my assessment that many of these could probably have been flown 
into Leningrad MD in a matter of hours, and that such a deployment of tactical combat 
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aircraft would have left little time to assess (let alone react to) the situation. In addition to the 
13th TAA the Leningrad MD also had about 245 IAPVO fighters.143  
Soviet use of military power was known to range from mere threats to large-scale 
intervention. In discussing Surprise Attack MC 161/70 stated that Soviet military doctrine 
[…] holds that a general war could begin with minimal military preparations and with little 
or no warning […] and asserts that an enormous advantage accrues to the side striking the 
first blow.144 It was further stated that a surprise attack, however unlikely, remains a 
possibility and would be the most disadvantageous situation for the West.145  
 
In case of a Soviet invasion it was assessed that the initial campaign, and the only one which 
could begin early in the setting of surprise, is that into north Norway. A surprise attack in this 
direction could be initiated in the form of a direct attack across the USSR-Norwegian border, 
supported by airborne assault and amphibious landings. Forces moving through Finland 
could arrive at the Norwegian border within a short period […] Finland would probably be 
forced to allow the movement of Soviet forces across her territory for an attack on Norway.146  
 
At the time the Soviet Bloc was no doubt seen as a powerful adversary, possessing huge 
military capabilities, and having a general objective of world communism under Soviet 
leadership.147 It was expected that the Soviet Union would continue to build up its economic 
and military power,148 and it was assessed that in the case of a surprise attack, the Soviets 
would try to achieve an optimum balance of surprise and weight of attack.149 In addition, as 
earlier discussed, concern was, in the MC 161/70, also expressed about the Soviet ability to 
shape military activities into a pattern of routine behaviour, which could come to be accepted 
by Western observers as normal. The discussion of surprise attack concludes that in sum, the 
Soviets would attempt to conceal their preparation to the extent that the only warning to the 
West would be that given by early warning systems after the attack had been launched.150  
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Chapter 3 in perspective 
Entering the 1960s the US weapon aid programme was coming to an end, whilst several of the 
Services’ weapon systems were becoming obsolete. Moreover, costs of defence related 
material and systems were increasing drastically. For instance the prices for new fighters had 
increased by 300% in just one decade. This was precisely when Norway was planning for 
large defence investments. These would have to be based on a reliable and re-examinable 
basis. The main tools for the NDRE in providing a basis for decisions in defence planning was 
OR, SA and quantitative methods, i.e. exactly the right kind of decision basis. In addition the 
NDRE was well regarded as a trustworthy and neutral institution. There can be little doubt 
that the NDRE was well aware of its position.  
 The Soviet Union was the primary threat, and vital lessons had been drawn from WWII. It 
was generally acknowledged that Norway would not be able to defend herself alone, and one 
feared in particular a paralyzing surprise attack preventing an organised defence from being 
mounted.  Several scenarios involving primarily limited Soviet attacks against north Norway 
were developed, and NATO had in its Medium Term Defence Plan set forth that a Soviet 
attack would be stopped in the Lyngen area.  
In spring 1968 the Norwegian Parliament issued Stortingsmelding 37, ‘Main guidelines for 
the organisation and activities of the Armed Forces in the period 1969-1973’. It stated that the 
ability to mount the strongest possible resistance to any kind of attack, and to prepare in the 
best possible way for allied assistance, continue to be the cornerstones of our defence efforts. 
These ambitions were very much in line with preceding long term plans, starting with the first 
three-year plan in 1946, and up to Stortingsmelding 84 of 1963 (covering the 1964-68 period). 
The CoD called for a general strengthening of the Army, with priority to north Norway, and 
he explicitly called for more fighter-bombers. 
In the recently declassified NATO intelligence report for the 1970-74 period, the MC 161/70, 
it is stated that in a campaign against Norway, Soviet objectives would be to seize bases on 
the coast, prevent NATO forces from using bases in the area, and widen Soviet early warning 
and air defence system. Soviet forces were assessed to be huge. According to MC 161/70 the 
Leningrad MD had 7 divisions ready for early commitment, 115 ground-attack combat 
aircraft, and 245 IAPVO fighters. The Northern Fleet had amphibious capacity and it also had 
125 bomber aircraft.  There were 900 LRA aircraft positioned in the north western Soviet, and 
Leningrad’s neighbouring MDs had more than 400 STA combat aircraft. Within the scope of 
this thesis it has unfortunately not been possible to compare the NATO assessments to 
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contemporary intelligence reports developed at the FO/E. However, based on available 
sources, and assuming that Norwegian services provided NATO with information on the 
situation in the northern region; there may be expected little or no differences between 
national and NATO views in these matters.  
A Soviet invasion was expected to be initiated as a surprise attack. The enemy would conceal 
his intentions as long as possible, including by conducting ‘fake’ exercises, as was the case 
prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. For the same reasons it was not expected that other 
forces than those already based in north western Soviet would take part in a surprise attack. If 
such an assumption were to prove correct this would on the one hand limit the amount of 
involved Soviet forces. On the other it would also be more difficult to detect that an attack 
was imminent. Moreover, the Soviets could have started to bring in more forces, for instance 
fighter-bombers from nearby MDs, the very minute the attack was in progress without any 
worry of compromising their intentions. Being counterfactual the effect of such a Soviet 
reinforcement is difficult to evaluate, but most likely this would have been beneficial to the 
Soviet side. It is in any case clear that the Soviet forces by far outnumbered Norwegian 
forces. The events of 1968 events contributed to a generally more complicated and unclear 
picture and it was into this situation that a well reputed NDRE was to be utilized. 
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4 The 1970-74 combat aircraft project  
Initiating the combat aircraft project – the NDRE pre-study  
The NDRE was mentioned on several occasions in Stortingsmelding nr 37 (1967-68). 
Keeping track of technological developments was important to the Armed Forces. In addition 
the NDRE was seen as a key player in involving national industries in defence related 
investments, and the political expectations could hardly have been clearer: In the next five-
year period it is necessary to make the most of the NDRE’s ability to, by analytic methods, 
contribute to long term planning […].151  The RNoAF request in 1969 to conduct an analysis 
on the roles and capabilities of future fighter aircraft fitted very well into this ambition. By 
March 1970 the NDRE finalised its pre-study ‘An analysis of the tasks of the combat aircraft 
in the Armed Forces’.152  The aim of the pre-study was to prepare for a research project on 
new combat aircraft by charting the possibilities and scope of such an analysis, and 
illuminating possible courses of action and particularly complicated problem areas.153 A 
month later, referring to the RNoAF request for a combat aircraft analysis, the Armed Forces 
Staff (FST) called for the analysis to be carried out as soon as possible.154 A research project 
on the matter was laid before the NDRE Research Chiefs Council in September 1970. The 
project proposal was a summary of the work done so far; mainly consisting of the pre-study, 
the work on ‘A Scenario for phase one of the Analysis of Combat aircraft for the 1975-1990 
Period’155 and several meetings between the NDRE, RNoAF and FST.156  The formal go-
ahead for the new project, referred to as job nr 242-S/161, was given on 15 October.157  
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The pre-study stated that the starting point for this study is the main tasks of our armed 
forces. Under the prerequisite of a set type of conflict – a limited attack on north Norway – 
one attempts to find the alternatives that are available to the RNoAF in helping to fulfil these 
tasks by the use of its combat aircraft, bases, ground based air defence systems and control 
and warning stations […]. A main issue in these discussions will be to clarify the possibilities 
of identifying measures of effectiveness which are comparable enough that they can form the 
basis for a credible comparison and prioritisation of the various mission types.158   
 
Two traditional main tasks for the Norwegian Armed Forces were identified as the basis for 
the pre-study: To deter aggression and, if attacked, to mount the most effective defence 
possible. The main tasks and the various means available for carrying them out were 
presented, with a listing of associated mission types.159  Three different Soviet attacks were 
discussed; a very limited attack on only a small part of Norway, a more ambitious attack 
aimed at taking bigger parts of Norwegian territory, and a conflict where the enemy set out to 
occupy the whole country. Assuming a limited attack, with enemy ambitions short of those 
outlined for the third type of conflict, the pre-study upheld that an attack on the northernmost 
parts of our country seems the most likely. This is mainly based on an assessment of the 
importance of this area for Soviet maritime expansion and the need for reliable access to the 
oceans.
160
  A surprise attack was deemed most likely, one in which a lack of ample warning 
time would deny timely mobilisation or allied reinforcements. The Soviet intent was assessed 
to be seizing control of important bases in Troms as soon as possible, and quickly creating a 
stable situation before a conflict developed with larger NATO forces. The pre-study stated 
that the size and composition of the enemy’s forces must be specified, and assumptions will 
have to be made on how the enemy will apply his forces.161  Allied fighter aircraft were 
expected to be of assistance within a few days. Norwegian mobilised forces (mainly army 
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units) were expected to join in on day three of the conflict, whilst allied ground forces could 
be expected after a few weeks.  
 
It may be noted, despite Norway’s openly declared inability to defend herself alone, and the 
view that allied help should be planned and prepared for in advance in order to be efficient, 
very few allied forces were earmarked for wartime service in Norway. In 1970 the only allied 
squadron of fighter aircraft earmarked for wartime operations from a Norwegian base was the 
USAF 3rd Air Force Task Force North (AFTFN).162 This unit was stationed in Britain, initially 
flying F-84Fs, and later the F-100 Super Sabres. Moreover, although earmarked for wartime 
operations in the northern region, the AFTFN aircraft would not be made available to 
CINCHNORTH before they had carried out strike missions under SACEUR’s Atomic Strike 
Plan (ASP). The AFTFN initially had Sola Airbase in Stavanger as their wartime base, and 
later Flesland Airport in Bergen. Both these bases are situated on the south-western coast of 
Norway. 
The Soviet invasion threat 
The pre-study examined Soviet invasion by land, sea and air assault.163 By attacking through 
the Finnish Wedge, two days would have to elapse between Soviet forces crossing the Soviet-
Finnish border before reaching the Lyngen area. If attacking through the north-easternmost 
part of Norway, approximately 3 – 4 days would elapse before Troms was reached. The 
Soviet forces would be mechanised, and mainly advance on roads. Sailing times would vary 
with a variety of factors. However, from entry into Norwegian waters it would take 
approximately one day before the forces were ashore and ready to advance. The pre-study had 
a detailed sketch of a typical landing area, with shoreline, distances, parking areas etc.164 A 
typical landing area would be in the inner parts of a fjord, relatively wide and flat, preferably 
with one or more quays, and with roads leading out of it. Thus the coast of Troms and 
Finnmark had relatively few suitable landing areas.  
Regarding airborne assault the pre-study found that a division could be landed on vital targets 
in north Norway in just hours. Heavy transport aircraft would be escorted by fighters, and 
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helicopters could be used from forward bases on Finnish territory to insert lightly equipped 
units in the Troms area.  
The use of combat aircraft 
The pre-study divided combat aircraft operations into two types, depending on whether they 
had a direct or indirect effect on the ground warfare. Operations aimed at destroying enemy 
land-based fighting units such as tanks, armoured vehicles, guns, troops etc were defined as 
direct-effect operations. Operations aimed at other types of enemy capabilities, such as escort, 
air defence systems, transport, air bases and combat aircraft were defined as indirect-effect 
operations.  
It may be argued that those definitions were somewhat unusual. For instance, using fighters to 
destroy enemy combat aircraft, whether on the ground or in the air, is commonly viewed to 
have a direct effect on achieving air superiority. In turn this creates freedom from enemy 
attack and, more importantly, freedom to manoeuvre other own forces (sea-, air- and ground). 
However, in the pre-study the term ‘direct operations’ strictly referred to operations aimed at 
directly inflicting damage on the opponents combating ground forces.165 RNoAF Air Power 
Doctrine gave three possible ways to define direct- and indirect-effect operations. Although 
not viewed to be the most common way, the pre-study was in fact in line with one of these 
three ways.166  
Direct- and indirect-effect operations were divided into six roles: Attack on surface targets, 
armed reconnaissance, fighter sweep, fighter escort, combat air patrol and scrambled 
interception.167 The two first mentioned roles were traditional anti-surface fighter-bomber 
roles. The rest were roles of counter-air operations. One of these can be seen as an offensive 
counter air role, as a fighter sweep was defined to be missions flown in an area with enemy air 
bases, aimed at attacking targets of opportunity.168  The remaining three roles were defensive 
counter-air. Intercepts carried out by aircraft scrambled from ground alert and initiated by the 
Control and Warning System (K&V System) would be aimed at preventing enemy transport 
aircraft, bombers and fighter-bombers from reaching their targets. For such a role to be 
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effective the pre-study pointed out the need for a certain capability in both detecting enemy 
aircraft as well as guiding interceptors to the target. The pre-study especially addressed the 
vulnerability of the contemporary K&V System to enemy Electronic Counter Measures 
(ECM), and its limitations in detecting aircraft at low altitudes.  
Fighter escort would primarily defend other aircraft, while CAP would primarily be used for 
defending surface combat units and bases. The roles of fighter escort and CAP were found to 
be quite similar, as both were aimed at establishing local air superiority in an area in order to 
reject incoming enemy aircraft intending to attack targets in that particular area.169 However, 
the effectiveness of fighter escort and CAP were expected to be limited, not only due to the 
real problem of detecting enemy aircraft. Fighters would also need ample time in order to get 
to the enemy before the enemy launched his weapons. Of the two roles CAP was seen as the 
most relevant, as CAP could be used to defend own surface operations vulnerable to enemy 
air attacks. 
 
The pre-study predicted that the upcoming analysis would have to clarify whether all 
incoming aircraft had to be shot down, and ultimately suggested that this was probably not 
necessary: A pilot who considers his chances of being shot down as quite high if he continues 
his mission, will tend to jettison his weapons and try not to be shot down. In the case of 
bomber aircraft it is likely that the aircraft will have to be shot down in order to prevent it 
from completing its mission. This type of assessments will be important in evaluating the 
effectiveness of combat aircraft in defensive counter air operations. 170 Along with the 
problems of K&V System detection of enemy aircraft; both regarding low level aircraft and 
the need for early detection so that defensive fighters could achieve tactical advantages, the 
range to the bases and aircraft endurance were thought to influence the effectiveness of own 
fighter operations. 
In examining the effect of combat aircraft on the course of war the pre-study aimed to find 
how combat aircraft could interact with sea and ground forces. 171 The effects of combat 
aircraft operations were defined as primary or secondary. Primary effect was direct, 
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observable results of combat aircraft missions, such as destroyed enemy tanks or enemy 
fighter-bombers aborting their missions. Secondary effect was the effect on the course of war; 
i.e. the influence on the realization of the armed forces’ two main tasks: To deter aggression 
or, if deterrence failed, put up a best possible defence. 
However, several factors could influence the effects of combat aircraft operations. What 
seemingly would be the one and same primary effect, for instance a destroyed tank, could 
produce quite different secondary effects (on the overall course of war), depending on the 
circumstances in which the tank was destroyed. Destroying a tank carrying out an attack, 
about to break through vital defence lines would produce a greater secondary effect than 
killing a reserve tank parked in an enemy rear area. Moreover, the primary effect in itself 
would also be affected by a range of variables: The number of combat aircraft sorties, the 
quality of the pilot, type of aircraft, type and number of weapons, terrain and weather, enemy 
actions and so on. Also the selection of targets would make a difference: Should one target 
enemy air bases, aircraft, sea or ground forces, or enemy support units or his lines of 
communication? Likewise the effects of combat aircraft operations would be influenced by 
what one selected to protect; whether it was own air bases, the K&V System, sea and ground 
forces, infrastructure and such.  
Measure of Effectiveness (MoE) 
One would clearly need some point of reference, something that could aid in carrying out the 
analysis in such a way that its results would be valid as a basis for decision-making. The pre-
study thus stated that in order to evaluate the value of the primary effects caused by the use of 
combat aircraft in wartime operations, it is necessary to establish a relevant measure of 
effectiveness.172  The pre-study found that all the primary effects that had been discussed were 
connected either to the relative strength of the enemy or external factors of significance to the 
battles, thus influencing the velocity of enemy advance and his possibilities to break 
through.173 Referring to these discussions the pre-study upheld that the measure of 
effectiveness must be seen in relation to the progress in the land warfare.174 The discussion on 
alternative measures of effectiveness started out by referring to the 1963 analysis, resulting in 
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buying F-5 fighter-bombers, and in which the number of destroyed enemy targets was used as 
the MoE. Such a MoE was considered relevant if all targets of interest were equally important 
relative to the overall course of the war. As this would not be the case in the upcoming 
analysis, such a MoE was ruled out.  
The pre-study also discussed the possibility of defining the value of own and enemy 
capabilities, by giving them ‘battle-points’. After determining points one would seek to 
maximise the number of destroyed enemy points, whilst minimising the loss of own points. 
However, with such a MoE it would have been necessary to concentrate on just one minor 
part of the conflict at a time, as the points given to the various units would express the value 
of that particular unit only within the exact context by which it received its points. The value 
of attacking similar targets outside that particular context (for instance forces under 
withdrawal, under deployment, or even fighting elsewhere in the theatre) could not have been 
measured using the same set of points. Although linked to the velocity of the enemy advance 
during an invasion, ‘battle-points’ as a MoE were ruled out. This was mainly because one 
thought that in assessing the entire course of an invasion […], it will not be sufficient to deal 
with parts of the conflict individually […]. Dispositions made in one stage of the conflict, will 
have consequences both for further fighting […] and for the ability to make use of our combat 
aircraft in the conflict phases that follow.175   
Based on this it was therefore found it would make the most sense to use the total time delay 
forced on the enemy up to the point where the most important areas are seized, as the 
measure of effectiveness. This will be a relevant measure of effectiveness in a situation where 
our in-place forces would not be strong enough to reject the invasion attempt on their own. 176   
The analysis and use of models 
The pre-study also discussed how the upcoming analysis would be carried out.177 It was 
pointed out that the guidelines for the analysis should be made on the basis of a realistic 
timeframe and manpower. Also the need for close cooperation between analysts and officers 
was pointed out. The necessity of defining an appropriate problem was addressed, along with 
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simplifications that could (or possibly would) have to be made to make the analysis 
manageable.  
In particular the use of models was addressed, with associated limitations, and the relationship 
between models and war-games. What data would be needed was discussed for the various 
roles and tasks, as well as associated systems and equipment. Some information would be 
available in Norway, but in other cases one would have to contact allies. Based on the threat 
and conflict scenario discussed earlier in the pre-study the invasion was formed into an 
integrated model consisting of progression models and a number of phases, based on the type 
of enemy activity.178 As an example the progression model for a sea invasion started with the 
enemy loading his vessels.179 After leaving its bases and transiting international waters, the 
enemy would then enter Norwegian waters, advance through Norwegian defences, before 
setting forces ashore, securing the landing area and then preparing to move on. The three 
progression models (land, sea, and airborne invasion forces respectively) would merge in a 
land battle phase, in which the invasion forces would try to seize their main areas of interest. 
In this phase one would thus seek to clarify those circumstances and factors that will be the 
most relevant for achieving an optimum use of combat aircraft.180  
The land battle phase would be described through relative strength of the forces, speed of 
enemy advance (based on factors as terrain, means of transportation, the need to fight or 
circumnavigate Norwegian defences and so on), and estimates of when the enemy would 
break through defence positions. It was expected that the result of the calculations in the land-
battle model would be an enemy advancement velocity, with a certain time elapsed before the 
enemy had seized the main area of objective of the invasion.181 The pre-study pointed out that 
in case Norwegian forces got the opportunity to repel the invasion forces on their own, then 
‘probability of repelling enemy forces’ could be used as a MoE. However, this was not 
considered an option in the upcoming analysis, based on assessments of Soviet strategy 
indicating that they will hardly start an invasion without considerable superiority in terms of 
strength of forces.182   
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The main purpose of the models would be to help analyse the effects of using combat aircraft. 
Regarding the relationship between models and war gaming, it was pointed out that using the 
model structure proposed in the pre-study would require a well defined conflict scenario. In 
turn this required a thorough understanding of the military operations involved, in turn 
requiring close contact between analysts and a few key military personnel who possess the 
right combination of overview, knowledge of details and ability to assess and think 
systematically.183  
The limitations of the model were also addressed. One of the general limitations discussed 
was that although army and navy operations would be incorporated in the analysis, this would 
only serve the purpose of clarifying how the other Services’ operations influenced a best 
possible choice on how to make use of the combat aircraft in defence matters, within a given 
cost framework to purchase and operate such aircraft.184  
Other limitations were discussed in greater detail. For instance the need for assumptions on 
how the enemy would make use of his aircraft was particularly contentious, as this could be of 
great significance for how our own combat aircraft can best be used.185 This matter would 
always be somewhat uncertain, and the analysis would therefore be aimed at finding an 
optimum allocation of combat aircraft for several different situations. One hoped to find how 
defensive counter air operations could best be carried out, and how this would affect the 
ability to conduct other types of missions, in situations involving offensive use of enemy 
aircraft. However, it would still be up to military planners, in a given situation, to assess the 
possibility of such a situation occurring, as well as whether this would, at any rate, call for 
the use of  defensive counter air operations or not.186  
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The Vesle Skaugum conference   
In March 1970, the same month that the pre-study was completed, the RNoAF Staff issued 
invitations to a conference at the RNoAF holiday resort Vesle-Skaugum on 13-14 April.187  
Referring to its 1969 request and the ongoing work at the NDRE, the RNoAF Staff invited the 
FST, the HQs of Northern and Southern Norway, the Air Force Material Command and the 
NDRE. The aim of the conference was to familiarise key personnel with the project, and to 
discuss guidelines and vital assumptions on which the analysis should be based. The report 
from the conference, a document of some 20 pages, covers the main topics that were 
discussed.188 It stated that after 1975 the RNoAF expected to gradually replace its combat 
aircraft. The resources available for this were assessed to be relatively limited. It would 
therefore be necessary to choose the new aircraft after careful consideration of operational 
effect and total cost. Aircraft performance, and with that the total cost, would to a great extent 
depend on what missions and tasks one prioritised.  
The first main topic to be discussed was the threat from the Soviet Union, which was divided 
into four classes of conflict.189 The first class was a limited Soviet attack on Finnmark, aimed 
at forcing political and military concessions. This attack was assessed to be possible without 
any foregoing tensions or episodes elsewhere in the NATO region. It was assessed that 
conflict class 1 would rest on a Soviet premise that such an attack could be accomplished so 
fast that NATO would not be able to,  or willing to react in time.190  This assumption was 
related only to class 1, not the other three. The Norwegian reaction would be to immediately 
establish a war-fighting situation and thus make it clear that Norway – and therefore NATO – 
was at war. Conflict class 2a described a Soviet attack aimed at occupying Finnmark and 
Troms. It was assessed that Soviet attacks would be made further to the south, at least in 
Nordland, to isolate the northern part of Norway. The national objective would be, along with 
that for class 1, to hold the area and at the same time prepare for receiving reinforcements. 
Class 2b was a larger version of 2a; still a somewhat limited Soviet attack, but now also 
Nordland would be occupied along with Finnmark and Troms. It was however assessed that 
already in a class 2a conflict most of the tasks that are of relevance to our combat aircraft 
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will be represented, included the matter of defending own airbases.  Assuming that the 
combat aircraft sector (combat aircraft, the active and passive defence of airbases and the 
Control and Warning System) will continue to receive approximately the same share of the 
defence budget as today, the heaviest types of conflict in these classes will possibly generate 
questions whether the available resources allow for a sensible way of dealing with given 
tasks.191 Conflict class 3 would be a large conventional Soviet attack, both from the north and 
from the south, aimed at occupying large parts of Norway. It was decided that with the total 
resources available to the national services, mounting a meaningful defence to a class 3 
conflict would be very complicated. The outcome of such conflicts, and the consequences for 
the Norwegian people and territory, would mainly depend on the priorities and efforts made 
by other states. It was thus stated that it is the view of FST that it is within conflict class 1 and 
2 that national defence efforts will be decisive in terms of deterrence, heightening the 
threshold for attack and the outcome of the warfare. It therefore follows that conflicts in these 
two classes should mainly be the basis for the planning problem at hand.192  
Two different ways of conducting the analysis were discussed; map studies and model 
studies. As the model studies were based more upon the use of quantitative methods than map 
studies, model studies would provide a much better and deeper understanding of the relations 
and mechanisms that determine the development and outcome of the conflict.193 It was thus 
stated that it would be most suitable to mainly focus the main portion of the work using model 
studies, and to supplement these with map studies to the extent time permitted.194 Developing 
knowledge and analysis tools was furthermore seen to be beneficial also in a wider 
perspective as they could be applied in future analyses on resource allocations in-between the 
Services depending on their efficiency in dealing with various conflict situations. These are 
likely problems that in the long term will become very central in our defence planning, and in 
which the Armed Forces as a whole will have much to gain having at their disposal a flexible, 
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well founded analysis tool.195 I find it likely that this was seen as important also for the sake 
of the NDRE, and not just for defence planning purposes. 
The matter of tasks in peacetime was also addressed, mainly focusing on the need to police 
national airspace. In addition the role of surveillance and reconnaissance was highlighted. It 
was recognised that the sheer size of Norway’s national airspace would in itself be an 
important factor. But more importantly measures of effectiveness were discussed. Initially it 
was stated that the MoE suggested by the NDRE (i.e. the amount of time that vital basing 
areas could be held), was well suited for evaluating most combat aircraft tasks in a situation 
of limited attack on a defined area.196 However, there were several objections that holding-
time as a MoE would have shortcomings.197 Three of these, concerning the use of combat 
aircraft in peacetime operations, the value of reconnaissance, and the value of establishing a 
clear situation of war fighting (upon invasion) by quickly inserting combat aircraft were only 
briefly discussed before being dismissed. This was partly due to problems in measuring the 
individual value of these operations, and partly because a quantitative comparison of the value 
of these operations to wartime operations would not be possible. Nevertheless, it was found 
that all three could to some extent be assessed separately if need be. The last concern 
addressed was that holding-time as a MoE might be inadequate in the case of an invasion 
aimed at a larger geographic area. This would cause problems in determining what bases and 
vital areas to hold; i.e. problems in defining the relative value of bases for instance in Troms 
compared to Trøndelag (the county south of Nordland). Even with a reasonable good 
understanding of which areas would be essential to hold, the increased complexity of such a 
large invasion scenario would complicate defining the relationship between the ability to hold 
these areas and the use of combat aircraft. Still, it was anticipated that quantitative sub-models 
would be helpful in making a good starting point for assessing these relationships. Also, an 
alternative MoE was discussed, namely using the amount of enemy effort needed to carry out 
the invasion in a defined amount of time. To use this MoE was however seen to be very 
similar to the use of ‘holding-time’. The only practical difference would be that one would 
have to determine a defined amount of time which would have elapsed by the point where 
Soviet troops had seized the goal areas of their invasion, and calculate ‘backwards’ from there 
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to find what effort this would have required. However, since these two measures of 
effectiveness for practical purposes were the same, ‘holding-time’ was viewed as the most 
preferred measure because the calculations will, in the case of ‘enemy effort’ as a criterion, be 
considerably more time consuming due to their complexity.198  
The report from the conference at Vesle Skaugum conveyed two main conclusions: At the 
next conference it would be vital to clarify what conflict situations to use as basis for the 
upcoming analysis work […], and also that the measure of effectiveness should be the subject 
of an increased and clarifying discussion.199   
Settling the scenario and MoE  
The next conference was held at the RNoAF headquarters in Oslo on 22 June 1970. A series 
of work-meetings had been held between the NDRE, RNoAF Staff and FST since the Vesle-
Skaugum conference. It was now believed that a basis for the upcoming work had been 
developed.200 FST approved the use of conflict classes 1, 2a, 2b and 3 as guidelines for the 
analysis.201  Following this conference the NDRE report S-222 ‘A Scenario for Phase One of 
the Analysis of Combat Aircraft for the 1975 – 1990 Period’ was developed, based on conflict 
class 2a and to a great extent built on the basis of plans developed during war games 
conducted at Headquarters Northern Norway (ØKN) in 1969.202 These 1969 war games, both 
the preparations for them as well as carrying them out, had been assisted by the NDRE 
System Group.203  
Although a few changes and adjustments were made, the Combat Aircraft Analysis was to a 
great extent based on scenario 2a, which set out to describe one of many equally likely attacks 
which may be launched against North Norway in 1980. This scenario will form a common 
                                                 
198
 Ibid p.20. Original text:[Det vil derfor – med den kompleksitet som vil ligge i disse beregningene – være 
betydelig mer tidskrevende å optimalisere med fiendtlig innsats som kriterium]. 
199
 Ibid p.22. Original text:[Det vil være meget vesentlig på dette møtet å få avklart hvilke konfliktsituasjoner 
som skal legges til grunn for det videre analysearbeid […] effektivitetskriteriet bør gjøres til gjenstand for en del 
videreførende og avklarende diskusjon]. 
200
 The NDRE Archive, Saksarkivet 161, 1970, letter titled The NDRE Study on the role of Combat Aircraft in 
the Armed Forces [FFIs Studie av kampflyenes plass i Forsvaret], signed General Major Førde, Chief of the 
RNoAF Staff, dated June 5th 1970. Original text:[En regner nu å ha utredet grunnlagsmaterialet for det videre 
arbeid]. 
201
 The NDRE Archive, Saksarkivet 161, 1970, letter titled Job 242-S/161Analyses on alternative use of 
resources in the Combat aircraft Sector [Jobb 242-S/161Analyse av alternative anvendelser av resurser innen 
kampflysektoren], signed Erik Klippenberg, dated November 9th 1970. 
202
 E. Reine, ’Et scenario for første fase av kampflyanalysen for perioden 1975-1990’, FFI Notat S-222 (1970), 
p. 3. Original text:[Det scenariet som er beskrevet i dette notatet bygger i store trekk på planer utarbeidet under 
ØKNs krigsspill i 1969]. 
203
 The NDRE Archive, Saksarkivet 161, 1972, letter titled Overview of NDRE System Group Analyses and 
Tasks in the period 1962-1972 [Oversikt over Jobber og Oppdrag utført av FFI Systemgruppen I perioden 1962-
1972], page 10. Signed by Erik Klippenberg, Chief of the System Group, dated 11th of July 1972. 
 54 
base for the development of various sub-models, all aimed at studying alternative roles and 
effectiveness of combat aircraft in the 1975 – 1990 period.204 
Moreover the scenario set forth that in case of a Soviet invasion; a situation of explicit war 
fighting was to be established as close to the border as possible, thus making it most likely 
that Norway would secure Allied reinforcements. The national Norwegian commander’s task 
were thus to delay Soviet advancements in north Norway while putting the main effort on 
defending bases in Troms in order to secure these reinforcements.205 It follows that with this 
not only the scenario was set for the oncoming Analyses, but also the MoE – i.e.‘holding 
time’– was set.       
S-222 set forth the scenario’s background to be a tense international situation. The Norwegian 
CoD has deployed forces from the south to the north (a fighter squadron, an infantry battalion, 
a SAM unit, two minelayers and a frigate).  The Soviets were to be conducting exercises with 
at least two motorized divisions on the Kola Peninsula, supported by strong tactical air forces. 
A large naval exercise has also just taken place in the Norwegian Sea. In order not to escalate 
the situation, the Norwegian government has however not acted on the CoD’s advice to call in 
reserves. The Chief of the Leningrad MD has been directed to occupy parts of north Norway 
through a surprise attack, with forces large enough to quickly reach a favourable state.206 In 
doing so he could make use of Finnish territory, but not Swedish. Based on these directives, 
operations orders were issued stating the objective to be to occupy Norwegian territory north 
of Lofoten – Vestfjorden.  Bases in Troms and airports in Finnmark were to be seized as soon 
as possible.207  
The air order of battle, not including fighter aircraft designated to defend Soviet territory,  
included 75 medium and light bombers, 175 interceptor fighters, 110 fighter-bombers, 5 
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW) aircraft, 150 transport aircraft, 60 
reconnaissance aircraft, 70 transport helicopters and 20 combat helicopters.208 It may be noted 
that the final Analysis does however not mention the 20 light bombers and the 20 combat 
helicopters.209  
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Land forces included four motorized infantry divisions, one Surface to Surface Missiles 
brigade, one Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) regiment, one engineer regiment, one field 
artillery brigade, one tank regiment, two paratrooper regiments and one marine infantry 
regiment.210 The naval forces were defined in more general terms, the Northern Fleet and 
likely changes that would be made closer to 1980 were referred to, particularly in relation to a 
force needed to transport and protect one marine infantry brigade and one motorized infantry 
division.211 The Soviet naval forces and the sea invasion scenario were given in detail in a 
NDRE report completed in May 1971.212  Using the 1971-report as a starting point, but with 
new assumptions on the contents and composition of a Soviet sea-invasion anno 1980, a 
revised report on the Soviet sea-invasion threat was completed in May 1973.213 In this report 
Soviet naval forces consisted of 20 landing craft transporting the marine infantry brigade, 
escorted by 3 destroyers and 11 frigates.  Another 24 commercial transport vessels (Volgoles 
class) would transport the motorized division, sailing with an identical escort force. These two 
groups would have four hours of spacing between them. In addition to 6 destroyers, each 
armed with two SAM systems and 76 mm guns, and 22 frigates each armed with one SAM 
system and 57 mm guns, there would also be a smaller group of Soviet naval vessels (1 
destroyer and 4 frigates) covering the flank to the south of the two escorted transportation 
groups. The assessments on the amount of forces available to the enemy were according to the 
Analysis made in cooperation with the Armed Forces Intelligence Service (FO/E).214 
 
For conflict classes 1, 2a and 2b it was assumed that the enemy wants to limit the operations 
as much as possible, and declare his goals reached before NATO or allies in general can 
react in a manner that will disturb his operations. The attack must therefore be as surprising 
as possible. Based on this it is hardly acceptable that the enemy will transfer forces from 
elsewhere in the Soviet Union to the northern region. 215 Given Soviet objectives and forces 
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as discussed above, the main features of the Soviet attack were assessed to be as shown in 
figure 2.  
Figure 2. Source: NDRE report S-12         
 
The main attack216 would consist of a Soviet motorized division of 11,000 men plus a tank 
regiment advancing towards the Bardufoss area through the Finnish Wedge. A reserve 
division stays in Finland. A third motorized division attacks the Varanger and Porsanger areas 
further northeast. A fourth motorized division is set ashore at three different locations; one 
third on Tromsøya (where Langnes airport is located), and two-thirds in the inner parts of 
Malangen.217 It may be noted that the S-222 assessed three different options regarding where 
sea-borne Soviet forces could be landed,218 and found that the Ulsfjord - Balsfjord (the fjord 
east of Malangen) area would be preferable. This was based on the assumption that a landing 
in Malangen would be the least surprising alternative, and that a strong Norwegian defence 
could be expected. Moreover, landing in the Ulsfjord - Balsfjord area would give the most 
favourable conditions for establishing contact with the land forces advancing through the 
Finnish Wedge. The division landing in Malangen was to be preceded by four hours by a 
marine infantry brigade. In addition, paratrooper regiments were to be landed on Tromsøya to 
secure Langnes airport, and at Olsborg (north of Bardufoss Air Base) in order to assist and 
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ease the advancement of the sea-borne invasion forces. The timing of the invasion was such 
that the land forces were to cross the Soviet-Finnish border 8 hours before the leading edge of 
the sea-borne invasion forces entered Norwegian territorial waters, assuming that Norwegian 
political authorities, in order to avoid provocation, would not issue mobilisation orders until 
the Norwegian borders had been violated. As the first Soviet naval vessels entered Norwegian 
waters Soviet aircraft were to attack the air bases in north Norway, aiming to preventing 
Norwegian combat aircraft operations. Simultaneously communications and radar sites in 
north Norway were to be attacked in order to reduce warning and control capabilities. The S-
222 assessed that the Soviet invasion would depend heavily on achieving and maintaining air 
superiority in the theatre until it achieved its main goals. Soviet air forces would therefore 
establish air bases in Finland in advance of the first crossing into Norwegian territory (time 
H), neutralize the K&V System from time H, neutralize air forces at bases Bodø and Andøya 
from time H to H + 48 hrs and those at Bardufoss from H to H + 24. Furthermore they would 
aim to achieve air superiority in the areas where air and sea forces would be landed, carry out 
interdiction, reconnaissance and CAS in support of its own surface operations in the theatre 
from time H onwards, support air transporters and bombers, establish own air bases on 
Norwegian territory, and also establish a forward Control and Warning capacity in order to be 
able to support air interceptions over occupied areas.219   
Chapter 4 in perspective 
With its request to the NDRE to carry out a Combat Aircraft Analysis in 1969, the RNoAF 
primarily intended to make sure that the F-5s and the F-104s would be replaced by new 
fighter aircraft. The well respected NDRE received this request where its services were 
clearly called for. The US weapon aid programmes had come to an end, prices for combat 
aircraft had rocketed, and Parliament had made it completely clear that the NDRE capability 
to provide a basis for military planning decisions would be very much needed in the coming 
years.  
Before quantitative methods could be applied, it was however necessary to clarify some vital 
guidelines and key factors. Initially the most important ones were to reach a clear and agreed-
on definition of a threat scenario, and how to best measure the effectiveness of own actions 
(i.e. set a MoE). In addition it would be necessary to clarify budget limits. On the latter it was 
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quite simply assumed that NOK 4 billion (in 1972-value) would be available for investments 
and operating costs in the combat aircraft sector over a 15-year span.220 
Threat scenario 2a seems to have been built with close attention to costly lessons drawn from 
WWII. It describes a surprise attack whereby the enemy invades and occupies parts of 
Norway very rapidly. Although not specifically addressed, the scenario seems at the same 
time also to mirror US and NATO thinking. This is not only due to the element of surprise or 
the use of Finnish territory, both of which were addressed in the contemporary NATO 
assessments of the Soviet threat towards the Scandinavian Peninsula. The point here is that 
Norway, viewed from an Allied perspective, would not be invaded for the sake of her territory 
itself. Rather the occupation would, as assessed in MC 161/70, be aimed at limiting NATO 
options and freedom of manoeuvre through the occupation of the very parts of Norway that 
scenario 2a describes. Soviet bases in north Norway would have extended Soviet early 
warning on NATO attacks, prohibited Allied use of bases in the region, and benefited Soviet 
submarine operations and strategic air attacks towards the West.  
 
Scenario 2a clearly took into account the fairly limited amount of resources that would be 
available for defence purposes. However, nothing in the sources at hand suggests that the 
anticipated amount of resources were argued to be too small. Doing so could arguably have 
been interpreted in several ways; for instance as a call for a re-thinking of the policy not to 
allow allied bases in peacetime, or as a call for substantially increased defence budgets and so 
on. At the same it was never upheld that the 2a scenario was the most probable one. The 2a 
scenario was chosen as basis for the Analyses because it was thought to represent a spectrum 
of conflicts that could be manageable with the resources available; based on the idea to 
structure our Armed Forces in such a way that it will be able to exploit its full potential in 
that part of the conflict spectrum where its relative importance is greatest.221 In other words; 
larger types of conflict would simply render Norwegian forces more or less obsolete in terms 
of influencing the outcome of the conflict, which in such a case would be determined by 
greater powers’ decisions and actions. Consequently the scenario rests quite heavily on a few 
but very vital assumptions; for instance that only those Soviet forces already positioned in the 
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region neighbouring Norway would be involved in the way that the scenario describes. In turn 
the Analyses themselves are of course equally dependant on the same assumptions.  
The MoE on which the Analyses are based – ‘holding time’ – was introduced by the NDRE  
already in the pre-study, referred to as the total time delay forced on the enemy before he 
reach his objectives in terms of occupied areas. ‘Holding time’ is thus not directly linked to 
the effects stemming from own fighter aircraft usage, as was the case in the F-5 study just a 
few years earlier. Instead the MoE chosen for the Analyses were inseparably tied to the 
warfare on land and the progress of Soviet advances and occupation of Norwegian territory. It 
is probable that this contributed to the opposition against ‘holding time’ as a MoE. The Air 
Force, primarily looking for new fighter aircraft, would probably have favoured a MoE which 
reflected directly the effect of combat aircraft operations.  
The 2a scenario resembled both lessons drawn from the war, contemporary allied assessments 
and repeated national political signals since WWII. In addition it took into account the limited 
amount of foreseeable defence resources. With the selection of the 2a scenario and ‘holding 
time’ as a MoE the stage was set for the upcoming Combat Aircraft Analyses, in which the 
aim would be to support the overall objective for the defence of Norway in case of invasion. 
This would be to produce, with the resources available, the greatest ‘holding-time’ possible, 
i.e. delaying enemy advances and thus preventing him (for as long as possible) from reaching 
his invasion goals.  
 
Chapter 4 is largely based on sources that up to now have been classified and therefore not 
available. Based on these sources it seems clear that the NDRE System Group took lead in the 
analysis work from the very start, initially aiming to establish a scenario and a MoE upon 
which the Analysis could be conducted. Viewed in a NDRE perspective an Armed Forces 
approval of these two elements seems to have been a necessity, and the 2a scenario and the 
use of ‘holding-time’ as the MoE were clarified and decided upon by the end of 1970. These 
two elements, originating at the NDRE and finalised with a close eye to political signals and 
in relatively close cooperation with the Armed Forces, were fundamental both as basis for and 
as prerequisite to the Analysis.  
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5 The Analyses and how to use own Combat Aircraft - 
Forward Air Defence and Attack on Seaborne Invasion 
Forces 
 
The Analysis’ final report, Report S-12, opens with a short summary stating that the RNoAF is 
planning to replace its present aircraft inventory of F-104 and F-5 aircraft in the time period 
from 1980 to 1985. […] The aim of the study was to clarify role priorities and desirable 
characteristics for the next generation of aircraft, and to find the balance in resource 
allocation between aircraft and support functions.222 In addition to (new) fighters, which were 
assumed to be serviceable for approximately 15 years, the combat aircraft sector also included 
main support functions such as air bases and the K&V System. It was assumed, as previously 
discussed, that a total 15-year budget of NOK 4 billon would be available for procurement 
and operational costs of the aircraft and associated support functions. It was further stated that 
the results show that top priority should be given to the roles of attack on seaborne invasion 
forces and forward air defence. Concentration of air resources in these two roles could 
considerably increase the ability of our entire defence forces to hold key areas in case of a 
limited surprise attack.223  
However, before examining these two roles we will briefly look into a few other aspects. 
After presenting the conflict classes and the 2a scenario the S-12 clarifies the use of ‘holding-
time’ as a MoE; defining it to be the amount of time our forces can hold key areas in the part 
of our country that is under attack.224 This is very much in line with how the MoE was 
described in the pre-study as previously discussed.225 As ‘holding-time’ is given in hours later 
in Report S-12, the reader is advised not to read too much into the numbers: One will warn 
against putting too much weight on the given amount of hours as an absolute measure of our 
defence forces’ ability to hold defined key areas. It is commonly acknowledged that 
operations tend to elapse quicker in analyses than they do in reality. However, used as a 
relative measure in comparing alternative combat aircraft structures, the calculated hours of 
holding-time are acceptable.226  
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Report S-12 described the use of models in making the Analysis. The description of the model 
system is relatively short and general. However, detailed descriptions of the models used are 
available in sub-reports such as NDRE Report S-362.227  The initial plan of how one should 
make use of models, as discussed both in the pre-study and at Vesle-Skaugum, was to 
programme the sub-models into a computer as one integrated model. This turned out to be 
problematic, as it was discovered that the computer available did not have the required 
capacity for such a comprehensive integrated model […]. One therefore proceeded with 
sections, consisting of two and two sub-models at a time.228 This resulted in the running-
through of a reduced number of alternative force compositions and strategies when compared 
to what had been initially hoped for. Although viewed as a limiting factor in the Analysis, this 
was not considered to be of substantial significance. Report S-12 also addressed the question 
of how to verify results through the use of the models. As a comparison between model 
results and real world results not was an option, one would have to verify model results in 
other ways. It was assessed that parts of the model results could be verified using American 
data and experiences; other parts could be verified using data from peacetime tests or 
exercises. Lastly; regarding model results to which not even those kinds of results are 
available, one will have to make use of experienced officers’ assessments of the results that 
the models produce.229 
Also, the establishing of combat aircraft classes was addressed. A variety of aircraft, up to 
some 20 - 30 types, were seen as potential candidates as a replacement for the F-104s and F-
5s. Such an amount of aircraft could simply not be handled within the Analysis, and thus 
combat aircraft classes (CACs) were developed. The CACs were defined by characteristics 
such as speed, manoeuvrability, dog-fighting ability, characteristics of the radar, short-field 
take off and landing capabilities, aircraft range and weapons load, accuracy in weapons 
delivery, and total cost.  
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The work on establishing the CACs was initiated early on, and was discussed with the Project 
Advisory Council in a meeting in February 1971.230 At this meeting seven CACs were 
proposed. The final set of nine CACs was described in detail and was, along with discussions 
on the use of various air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, presented in NDRE Report S-
350.231  It may be noted that CAC 1 and 2 were included only as part of the threat. The costs 
associated with CAC 2, in which the reference aircraft was the F-14 Tomcat, were regarded as 
too high. It may also be 
observed that although 
each CAC was given a 
reference type aircraft, 
these were not to be 
seen as a first choice 
within their respective 
CAC. The reference 
aircraft mainly served 
the purpose of illustrating the various CACs and the characteristics that could make them 
interesting as alternatives for the RNoAF.  
After assessing what categories of weapons were best suited for the various types of targets 
within the scenario at hand, a relatively limited number of various weapons were selected for 
use in the Analysis. In general the efficiency of these weapons (against air, army and naval 
targets respectively) was well known, except in the case of guided and homing anti-ship 
missiles. Nevertheless, although new at the time, these weapons were expected to become 
highly efficient.232 However, as their efficiency under real world conditions was unknown, 
one arranged the analyses on this particular matter so that one could identify a minimum 
efficiency level for this type of weapon to stay relevant throughout the analysis process. It 
was thus stated that the results of this analysis will greatly depend on whether the efficiency is 
found to be above this critical lower limit. It is therefore important that the development of 
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Table 1: Combat Aircraft Classes (CAC).  
CAC Description Ref type aircraft 
1 Medium heavy bomber  Blinder, Badger 
2 Very advanced interceptor fighter Foxbat, F-14 
3 Simple fighter-bomber F-5E, Fishbed 
4 Advanced subsonic fighter-bomber A-7 
5 Advanced supersonic fighter-bomber Cobra, F-15 
6 Armed trainer aircraft Saab 105G, Alphajet 
7 VTOL fighter-bomber Harrier 
8 Armed helicopter AH-1 
9 Armed light aircraft MFI-17 
Source: NDRE Reports S-350 and S-12 
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these new anti-ship weapons is closely monitored after the completion of the analysis at 
hand.233  
Forward air defence 
The Analysis pointed out two roles to be the most interesting: Attacking seaborne invasion 
forces (or ‘Anti-Shipping’), and defensive counter air operations over the battle area 
(hereafter DCA). Within the scope of the Analysis air defence operations were viewed in light 
of three main problem areas:  
- Own ground forces’ need for air support. 
- The attackers’ need for air superiority, and thus his ability to secure his operations.  
- The possibilities of keeping own forward located air bases open for reinforcements.  
The first problem area (the Army’s need for air support) was divided into two categories; 
offensive and defensive support respectively. Offensive support was defined to be the use of 
own fighter-bombers against enemy ground forces in order to inflict as much damage and 
delay as possible. Defensive support was defined to be the use of own aircraft in an air 
superiority role, aimed at preventing enemy fighter-bombers from attacking our ground 
forces. All CACs could to some extent conduct offensive operations against army targets, but 
only classes 3 and 5 were viewed to have satisfactory qualities in a defensive role.234 In 
further discussions it is therefore referred to CACs 3 and 5.  
The Army’s need for air support was based on the results from four sub-studies, which in turn 
were underpinned by several NDRE reports. For instance; the sub-study on the effect of 
fighter-bomber attacks against various army targets was supported by reports on losses 
inflicted upon land forces by battlefield support and interdict missions,235 the effect of using 
fighter-bombers against targets at sea and on land236 and air-to-surface delivery of unguided 
weapons.237  Typical factors of importance in the sub-studies were navigation, target detection 
and own losses to enemy ground-based air defences. Also weapon delivery methods and 
weapon types were of particular interest. For instance, regarding attacks against enemy army 
targets, it was presupposed that if they were to be undertaken, such attacks would involve the 
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use of cluster weapons, as these were seen as the most effective type of weapon against most 
targets.238   
Another of the four sub-studies looked into the effect of offensive combat aircraft support on 
army units conducting delaying operations in funnelling terrain.239 One of the main findings 
in this sub-study was simply that because of our army’s inferiority its tactic must be to 
conduct delaying combat operations.240  This would be achieved through the use of fairly 
small units pre-positioned at carefully selected places along the enemy’s path of advance; 
places where the enemy would not be able to benefit from having larger forces. Through early 
preparation of several such positions (hereafter referred to as ‘bottleneck positions’) along the 
expected route of enemy advancement, and other measures such as demolition and 
roadblocks, it was expected that the army would be able to cause fairly substantial delays to 
the progress of enemy army units’ advance.241 
The third sub-study looked into the effect of air defence operations under various levels of 
support from the K&V System.242 It stated that the effect of air defence operations has proved 
to depend heavily on the possibility to give warning of enemy air activity,  and the possibility 
of conducting [tactical] control of fighter aircraft.243 In peacetime the K&V System would 
allow own fighters to stay on ground alert. Upon detection of enemy air activity own fighters 
would be scrambled and give precise vectoring to their targets. However, the K&V System 
was expected to be operational for only a few hours after the outbreak of a Soviet attack. 
From then on DCA would have to be conducted as CAP, leaving it to the fighters themselves 
to detect and intercept enemy aircraft. The Analysis found that less accurate vectoring 
(hereafter referred to as ‘coarse vectoring’) than was typically available in peacetime would 
be sufficient in wartime, provided that own fighters were equipped with air-to-air radar. In 
that case an average deviation from actual target data of up to 5 nautical miles off actual 
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position, 15 degrees off in course, and 50 knots off in speed, would be acceptable.244  It was 
concluded that a supplementation and strengthening of the K&V System is necessary, both 
with regard to sensors and communication systems, but it was also made clear that ‘coarse 
vectoring’ would suffice.245 One should not aim for the level of vectoring accuracy that would 
typically be available in undisturbed peacetime operations. An own project (Job 285-E/113) 
was established at the NDRE in order to find proper and economically feasible solutions to 
these matters.246 
The fourth and last sub-study on the Army’s need for air support studied the effect of air 
defence operations under various levels of airbase support, particularly in terms of producing 
aircraft sorties.247 The discussions assumed that the air bases would be in such a condition that 
the fighter fleet could be efficiently used during the first vital days of a conflict. Bases at 
which operational flying units were regularly stationed had in general been enabled to 
produce enough sorties to meet peacetime training requirements. Those bases therefore had a 
fairly good (though unprotected) maintenance capacity, a rather limited weapon support 
capacity, and practically no runway rapid repair (RRR) capacity. Air bases with no regularly 
stationed flying units had severe shortcomings in all these capacities. A more balanced 
support system for aircraft sortie production was found to be necessary, with a considerable 
strengthening in the areas of RRR, maintenance & repair of aircraft (which would have to be 
performed in protected facilities) and weapon support & turnaround capacity.248 The issue of 
RRR was thoroughly addressed. The S-222 threat scenario contained a defined amount of 
Soviet aircraft capable of conducting runway attacks, and the effect of runway bombing was 
carefully studied.249 Some of the problems associated with damaged runways could be 
alleviated through other measures than RRR, for instance via short field takeoff and landing 
capacities in the (new) fighters. Such measures could however not be expected to be sufficient 
alone. Moreover, as the building of hardened aircraft shelters (due to lessons taken from the 
1967 six-day war) had increased, the interest in runway attacks had also grown. SHAPE had 
set specific time limits for repairing defined runway damage, but so far only the RAF had 
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developed a RRR capacity that could meet those requirements. The RAF RRR concept was 
studied in detail at the NDRE.250  
 
The threat scenario on which the Analysis was based assumed that a Soviet attack would 
involve 110 fighter-bombers (50 advanced, 60 simple) and 175 interceptor fighters (35 very 
advanced, 60 advanced and 80 simple).251 However, not all of these aircraft would be used in 
support of Soviet land operations, and thus different combinations of fighter-bombers and 
interceptors were studied. Norwegian fighter forces are based on a 15-year budget of NOK 4 
billon which would allow for either 48 CAC 5 advanced supersonic fighter-bombers, or 120 
CAC 3 simple fighter-bombers. Fighters would have to be deployed to bases in the Troms 
area. Fighters on ground alert at Bodø, and any of the other bases further south, were assessed 
to be too far away from the battle area given the estimated warning time.252     
Two main strategies for how Soviet fighters would be used were put forward. In strategy one 
(S1) fighter-bombers would be used against Norwegian army units. At the same time Soviet 
interceptor fighters would fly CAP over the battle area, in order to prevent RNoAF fighter-
bombers from attacking Soviet ground forces. Strategy two (S2) was different with respect to 
the use of the Soviet interceptor fighters, who in S2 would be specifically used against 
RNoAF air defence fighters. In S2 the Soviet interceptor fighters would fly fighter sweep 
missions. This meant flying into Norwegian airspace, where RNoAF fighters would then be 
drawn into aerial combat. The aim was to tie up and preferably kill as many RNoAF fighters 
as possible. The purpose of S2 was to prevent RNoAF fighters from interfering with Soviet 
offensive fighter-bombers, and not (as was the case in S1) to prevent RNoAF aircraft from 
attacking Soviet ground forces. 
Based on the four mentioned sub-studies and the various reports supporting them, evaluations 
were made on the kind of fighter aircraft needed to support the Army- offensive, defensive or 
a mix thereof. 253  The aim was to find what would produce the most ‘holding-time’ for the 
Norwegian defence as a whole. ‘Holding time’ was given in hours, varying with the use of 
own fighters, and reflecting how much time that would elapse before Soviet forces had seized 
control of the Bardufoss region. A full presentation of all results is given in NDRE Report S-
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63 ‘The use of fighters in support of the Army’.254  However, here it will be sufficient to look 
at the results that reflect the use of CAC 5 and CAC 3 respectively, with variations in the 
number of aircraft used in an offensive (RNoAF fighter-bombers against Soviet ground 
forces) and defensive role (RNoAF fighters aimed at preventing Soviet fighter-bombers from 
attacking ground forces).  
In case of a Strategy 1 (S1) Soviet attack, assuming 80 Soviet fighter-bombers and 50 
interceptors, and with no use of RNoAF fighters whatsoever, the ‘holding-time’ would have 
been 64 hours. With the use of CAC 5, without assistance in the form of ‘coarse vectoring’ 
from the K&V System, the ‘holding-time’ would increase to 70 hours. It is noteworthy that 
this would be the case whether all CAC 5 fighters were used for CAP, or if they were used 
solely in an offensive role. The reason for such a low increase in ‘holding-time’ (from 64 to 
70 hours) is the sheer size of the fighter fleet. Just 48 CAC 5 aircraft would have been 
ineffective flying CAP missions. If own fighters were to be used only in an offensive role, the 
Soviet fighter-bombers could have targeted army units undisturbed. The available Soviet 
fighter-bomber strength would be sufficient to inflict such damage that Norwegian units 
would have to withdraw from their ‘bottleneck positions’ before causing desired delays to the 
attacking Soviet forces. The Norwegian side could not have expected to succeed through a 
similar method of operations. Being much smaller than the adversary, and facing much larger 
ground forces (division-size), the Norwegian CAC 5 fighter fleet could not have inflicted 
enough damage on the enemy. In other words, as it was relatively expensive, only 48 CAC 5 
advanced supersonic fighter-bombers could be purchased. In order to achieve any effect worth 
mentioning from such a low number of fighters, it would have been a necessity for our K&V 
System to at the very least produce ‘coarse vectoring’. On the other hand, with 50% of the 
CAC 5 aircraft (i.e. 24 fighters) used in a defensive role, supported with ‘coarse vectoring’ 
(the other half still in an offensive role), the ‘holding-time’ increased to 110 hours. With 75% 
of CAC 5 on defensive missions and ‘coarse vectoring’ the ‘holding-time’ would increase to 
140 hours, or nearly six days.  
Similar findings were made when evaluating the less advanced CAC 3 in the same S1 
situation. No own fighter usage gave the same 64 hours of ‘holding-time’. With all 120 CAC 
3 fighters in an offensive role the ‘holding-time’ increased to approximately 70 hours. Also, 
an increase of fighters in a defensive role resulted in more ‘holding-time’. 75% of the CAC 3 
in a defensive role and ‘coarse vectoring’ gave about 120 hours ‘holding-time’. But, regarding 
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CAP missions without ‘coarse vectoring’ from the K&V System , the CAC 3 would be the 
better choice. ‘Holding-time’ would have stayed 70 hours no matter how many of the 
available CAC 5 fighters flew CAP, due to the low number of aircraft available. However, 
using 75% of the CAC 3 fighters on CAP would increase the ‘holding-time’ to 90 hours. 
Nevertheless, a particular finding regarding support to the Army is quite important here.255 
The best use of the Army would be to fight from ‘bottleneck positions’, as this would cause as 
much delay as possible to advancing enemy forces. In order to secure this type of army 
operations it would thus be vital to protect them against Soviet fighter-bombers. It would be 
pointless to even consider offensive missions in support of army forces before this was 
assured. In short, supporting the Army through defensive missions would result in the most 
‘holding-time’ – a finding that was valid for both CAC 3 and CAC 5.     
S1 would have involved a lot of enemy effort in protecting the ground advance from air 
attacks. These evaluations and findings regarding the use of S1 were also considered to likely 
be found by the Soviets. The Analysis assessed that with the same knowledge and insight into 
the aspects discussed, the adversary would not choose such a strategy. The biggest threat to 
him would not be our fighter-bombers; rather it would be our air defence forces used in order 
to prevent Soviet fighter-bombers from attacking our army units.256    
 
In the case of Strategy 2 (S2) the evaluations gave somewhat different results. The Soviet 
side, who in S1 would have used up to 50 interceptor fighters in order to prevent Norwegian 
fighter-bombers from attacking Soviet ground troops, would in S2 fly fighter sweep missions 
with these interceptors. With 75% of Norwegian fighters on defensive missions, receiving 
‘coarse vectoring’, and other parameters staying the same, a CAC 5 fighter fleet were found to 
give a “maximum” ‘holding-time’ of 140 hours in a S1 situation. But in a S2 situation, with 
some 50 Soviet interceptors flying sweep missions, the ‘holding-time’ would be reduced from 
140 to 80 hours. Using CAC 3, a max ‘holding-time’ of 120 hours would have been 
achievable in a S1 situation. With 75% of the CAC 3 fighters used defensively the ‘holding-
time’ would have been reduced to 90 hours in a S2 situation.  
Although ‘holding-times’ would decrease in a S2 situation compared to a S1, an important 
finding remained valid. Given the assumptions that were made about the scenario in general, 
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and on enemy forces and strategies in particular, RNoAF fighters should fly defensive 
missions in support of the Army. This also would result in the most ‘holding-time’ during a 
S2 situation. Priority to air defence missions would result in up to 90 hours of ‘holding-time’ 
in the case of S2, and up to 140 hours in S1. Flying no defensive missions and putting 
maximum priority on offensive missions would have given up to 70 hours whether CAC 5 or 
CAC 3 was used. In other words: Flying defensive counter air missions with 75% of the 
fighters would produce nearly a full day of additional ‘holding-time’. Depending on the 
enemy choice of strategy, priority to defensive counter air would at best result in nearly six 
days of ‘holding-time’; approximately double of what could have been achieved otherwise.  
 
The arguments in favour of defensive counter air, apart from the increase in ‘holding-time’, 
can be summed up as follows.257 The use of own fighters in the role of defensive counter air 
was based on the Army’s need for protection against enemy air attacks. Unhindered aircraft 
attacks against Norwegian ground forces (that aimed to fight at carefully selected ‘bottleneck 
positions’ along the enemy route of advancement) would spoil the chances of creating any 
substantial delays to the Soviet advance. Furthermore, RNoAF air defence fighters would be a 
threat not only to Soviet fighters, but also to bombers, transport aircraft and so on. Hence, in 
order to avoid unacceptable risk of losses, the enemy would have to protect his assets by 
providing them with fighter escort. In other words; Soviet fighter aircraft would have to carry 
out a number of different tasks. In turn this would lead to fewer Soviet fighters in any given 
position where the Norwegian side might choose to concentrate its own fighter activities. 
Lastly, forward air defence along with a strengthened RRR capacity would make it possible to 
fly in reinforcements to airbases in the Troms region.  
Attack on seaborne invasion forces 
It was assumed that a Soviet attack would involve two waves of ships, each escorted by 14 
frigates and destroyers. The first wave would consist of 20 landing craft (primarily Polnochny 
class). This wave would set ashore a marine infantry brigade of 1,900 men and 2,500 tons of 
munitions, fuel and other equipment.  The goal of the first wave would be to seize and secure 
landing areas. The second wave would follow approximately 4 hours later, consisting of 24 
merchant vessels (primarily Volgoles class vessels) equipped with cranes, carrying a 
motorised infantry division of approximately 11,000 men and 30,000 tons of munitions, fuel 
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and equipment.258 The landing of the division would be assisted by the first wave landing 
craft.259 The main goal for the infantry division would be to move towards Bardufoss and, 
along with the Soviet paratrooper regiment landed in the Olsborg area, take control of the 
Bardufoss area as soon as possible.    
The air defence capability of the escort vessels would be substantial, with the potential of 
inflicting decisive losses on the RNoAF fighter fleet. The analysis of the Anti-Shipping 
operations were based partly on sub-studies of maritime operations, the capacity of the air 
bases, air defence operations and the SAM and Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) capacity of 
Soviet naval escort-vessels.260 Two aspects were in particular studied as to the use of fighters 
in an Anti-Shipping role. The first was to discover how much Anti-Shipping force would be 
needed, and what affects such operations would have. The second was to discover what 
category of weapon would contribute the most to reducing the vulnerability of own aircraft, 
whilst simultaneously producing the desired amount of Soviet losses. 
 
Four main categories of weapons were assessed. These included short range weapons (such as 
2,75” or 5,0” rockets, or conventional bombs), laser guided bombs, laser guided missiles and 
finally full stand-off capable missiles.261 The latter could be launched 30 kilometres or more 
from the target, and different guidance systems (such as active or passive radar, or TV) were 
available. The two former types were assessed to involve too many losses of own aircraft to 
enemy seaborne SAM and AAA systems, as both types of weapons would require either 
weapon release at short ranges, and/or prolonged exposure time to enemy weapon systems. 
The use of missiles proved more promising. Cost-efficiency comparisons between short range 
weapons on one the hand, and laser guided missiles on the other clearly favoured laser guided 
missiles. However, as laser guided missiles had to be launched at a range typically 15 to 10 
kilometres from a target, the attacking aircraft would still be inside enemy SAM coverage. 
This would involve losses, although less so than in the case of short range weapons.  
The laser guided missile was clearly better than the first two weapon categories, but it 
nevertheless fell short of full stand-off capable missiles. Given the same circumstances as 
with the use of laser guided missiles, losses of own aircraft using full stand-off capable 
missiles would occur only through engagements with Soviet fighter aircraft. Losses using 
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short range weapons would have been from 75 -85 %, whereas losses using missiles would be 
between 30 - 40 %. Reduced loss rates would keep more aircraft available for later use.  
 
Also when looking into the need for Anti-Shipping operations the overall aim of the Analysis 
was to find what effect this would have on ‘holding-time’ as a whole. However, the use of air 
forces could not be considered and evaluated isolated from the effects stemming from the use 
of maritime and land forces. In addition it was necessary to make assumptions, of which one 
is of particular interest. The sea-invasion phase was assessed to last approximately 24 hours, 
and tempo would be of the utmost essence.262 For instance, if mobilisation was ordered at 
time H, then at best only the Third Infantry Battalion would be in place to fight in the Skibotn 
area, in an attempt to stop Soviet air and sea landed forces. Forces becoming available later 
than H + 30 hours would not be able to help stop the sea-invading forces at all. This would 
have been a very difficult situation, in which not even an optimum usage of combat aircraft 
would suffice. However, such a situation would not come about if Simple Alert were declared 
as Soviet forces crossed into Finland. Thus, in order to be able to describe and clarify the 
effects of using fighters in Anti-Shipping operations, such a declaration of Simple Alert were 
set as an assumption263.   
The two main components contributing to a swift and speedy invasion were Soviet air and sea 
landing forces. Studying the paratrooper regiment that was expected to be landed in the 
Olsborg area, evaluations showed that own fighters would not be able to inflict enough 
damage to this regiment to render it unable to carry out its mission. Although not considered 
likely, the Analysis still presented results where the Soviet air landing operations failed. 
Several roads merge in Olsborg, located south of the division landing area, and 15 kilometres 
north of Bardufoss. Control of Olsborg would be vital for a speedy transit southbound for the 
motorized infantry division. Once ashore and ready to move the infantry division, divided into 
three groups, would progress southbound.264  
Operations against seaborne invasion forces would be carried out by naval forces 
(submarines, surface vessels and coastal forts) and combat aircraft. Evaluations showed that if 
an air and sea landing operation as outlined in the threat scenario was launched, the Soviets 
would reach Bardufoss and put the airbase under fire in 30 to 40 hours (closer to 30 hours 
with successful paratrooper operations directed at Olsborg). Nearly twice as much time would 
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have been required had the Soviets tried to achieve the same without seaborne forces. In such 
a case about 75 hours would have elapsed before Bardufoss was under fire. Evaluations on 
how the overall ‘holding-time’ could be affected by inflicting losses on the Soviet seaborne 
forces showed that the situation in which Soviet forces reached Bardufoss after 30 – 40 hours 
could only be prevented by inflicting losses on the sea invasion forces of up to 50 %, or 
slightly more, through combined use of own maritime forces and combat aircraft.265  
Results from evaluating the different CACs in an Anti-Shipping role showed that the least 
capable CACs were in fact unusable in such a role, as they would in any instance not be able 
to inflict the necessary losses on the enemy seaborne forces. Furthermore, the studies on the 
various types of weapons showed that own loss rates would be very high (up to 85 %) using 
short range weapons. Nevertheless, the capabilities of such weapons were known, and they 
were in themselves relatively cheap. On the other hand, even if the best suited CAC armed 
with short range weapons had been used, this would still require 70 – 80 % of the fighters 
flying Anti-Shipping in order to inflict 50 % losses on Soviet seaborne forces. Inevitably, in 
doing so the majority of RNoAF fighters would be lost.  
At the time both laser guided missiles and full stand-off capable missiles were associated with 
various uncertainties. In the case of laser guided missiles the Analysis stated that it was likely 
that countermeasures would be developed, and that these could be expected to reduce missile 
efficiency. Also, if necessary to close-in to within 15 kilometres before being able to launch, 
the shooter would have been well inside the reach of enemy SAM systems. In principal the 
target could be laser illuminated by any source (the combat aircraft itself, or another aircraft, 
or a surface unit). Nevertheless, lasing would have to be done, at least for the final portion of 
the missile time of flight. Besides active (e.g. shooting back) and passive (e.g. putting out 
smoke) enemy actions, weather phenomena like clouds, precipitation, fog and mist can pose 
problems for laser operations.  
The Analysis held that several types of full stand-off capable missiles were available at the 
time. However, it also found that there are considerable uncertainties associated with the 
efficiency of these weapons used in Norwegian coastal waters, under operationally realistic 
conditions, and taken into consideration weapon related weaknesses and failures and 
countermeasures.266 There were no doubt serious uncertainties associated with the use of the 
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missiles available for use in the Anti-Shipping role. However, losses would have been 
unacceptable using short range weapons, and the use of these weapons would not have 
enabled our anti-shipping forces to prevent an expeditious seaborne invasion from 
succeeding.267 The Analysis thus went on to study in more detail what results Anti-Shipping 
missiles would bring.  
Given the various uncertainties discussed above, the probability of stopping the targeted 
vessel was set relatively low. In the case of laser guided missiles this probability was defined 
at 40% for two missiles. Full stand-off capable missiles were given a stopping probability of 
15% for two missiles.268 Several findings were made, of which two are of particular interest 
here. Firstly, using missiles would produce the desired 50% enemy losses with the established 
stoppage probabilities. Secondly, in the case of CAC 3 such enemy losses would be reached 
using approximately 30% of friendly fighters, whilst using CAC 5 would have required some 
50 % of the fighter fleet in order to achieve this level of enemy losses. The reason for this was 
not related to weapon efficiency. It was simply due to a higher total number of CAC 3 fighter 
aircraft, and thus more weapon carriers, compared to what would have been the case with the 
relatively more expensive CAC 5. Based on these findings the Analysis concluded that the 
role of Anti-Shipping should be carried out using advanced weapons; i.e. missiles, and that it 
would be necessary to inflict approximately 50% losses on the Soviet seaborne force. Finally, 
given a total budget of approximately NOK 4 billion over a period of 15 years, it was found 
that the CAC 3 also made itself relevant in this role. Very expensive weapon carriers would 
simply demand a disproportionate amount of resources to be used in the Anti-Shipping 
role.269   
Chapter 5 in perspective 
Also chapter 5 is by large based on sources that hitherto have not been available due to their 
classification. Regarding the use of the Norwegian army, it was found that it would be best to 
fight from ‘bottleneck positions’, aiming at causing as much delay as possible to invading 
Soviet forces. Without protection against Soviet fighter-bomber attacks the Norwegian army 
units would quickly have been destroyed or forced to withdraw.  
Without any use of fighters the ‘holding time’ would have been 64 hours. Using all fighters in 
an offensive role (CAC 3 or 5) would have increased the ‘holding time’ to 70 hours. Two 
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different Soviet air strategies were assessed (S1 and S2). The S1 would have been the 
preferred one from a Norwegian standpoint. Using 75% of the CAC 3 fleet in a defensive 
role, given ‘coarse vectoring’ by the K&V System, would have produced 120 hours of 
‘holding-time’ in an S1 situation, and 140 hours if using CAC 5s.  
In a S2 situation the results were different. Given the same circumstances (75% of the fleet in 
a defensive role, with ‘coarse vectoring’) CAC 5 fighters would now produce 80 hours of 
‘holding-time’, whilst using CAC 3s would have produced 90 hours. Nevertheless, although 
holding-times decreased in an S2 situation compared to S1, an important finding stayed valid: 
As flying only offensive missions (and no defensive missions) would at best have produced 
70 hours ‘holding-time’, priority to DCA remained the best option. In short; supporting the 
Army through flying DCA would give the most ‘holding-time’. 
The main goal for the sea invasion forces would be to land and then move south to take 
control of the Bardufoss area. If the sea invasion had been carried out as described in the 
scenario, Bardufoss would have been under fire in 30 – 40 hours. It was assessed that such a 
speedy attack towards Bardufoss could only be prevented by stopping or destroying at least 
50% of the sea invasion forces, which would have been met by naval forces and combat 
aircraft. For the latter several categories of anti-shipping weapons were studied. Short range 
weapons proved to be an unrealistic option due to high loss rates. Although associated with 
uncertainties, the use of missiles in the Anti-Shipping role was preferred as the best option. 
Both CAC 3 and 5 could produce the desired 50% of enemy losses using missiles. However, 
this would require the use of only 30% of the CAC 3 fleet, as opposed to half of the CAC 5s.  
The reason for this was simply due to the higher total number of the cheaper CAC 3 fighter 
aircraft available, and thus more weapon carriers.  
As discussed earlier the Analyses rest on some quite important assumptions. The two Soviet 
air strategies serve as interesting examples. The Soviets could unquestionably have used their 
fighters in several other ways. Likewise, it is certainly true that if the Norwegian side could 
evaluate the consequences of varying air strategies, then the Soviets could as well. However, 
in retrospect I find it equally likely that such evaluations could have been made, on both the 
Norwegian and the Soviet side, also after operations commenced. Hypothetically, if this had 
been incorporated into the Analyses, this might have altered some of its conclusions. On the 
other hand; the more variables one introduces, the more complicated the calculations and 
evaluations become. In the worst case one could have ended up with an unmanageable set of 
analyses, unable to make conclusions and recommendations upon which long term military 
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planning decisions could have been made. I find it likely that the latter would have been an 
undesirable outcome seen both in an Air Force and NDRE perspective.  
The sea-invasion scenario was based on what was foreseen to be the size and composition of a 
Soviet naval invasion threat around 1980.270  Contemporary anti-shipping missiles were 
associated with uncertainties, and the Analyses stated that development of such missiles 
would be very important. However, the point here is that there were seemingly not expected a 
similar development in other types of weapons, or in the way other weapons could be used. 
Laser guided bombs were introduced in the Vietnam War, and it would have been fair to 
expect a similar type of development in land-attack weapons as one foresaw for anti-shipping 
missiles. The Six Day War (1967) had shown how Israeli fighters managed to conceal their 
intentions of attacking Arab airforces on the ground, and how they in less than two days 
destroyed and inhibited operations from several Arab airbases. Again, too many variables 
would probably render it impossible to carry out the Analyses. It nevertheless seems that 
expectations were high regarding opportunities and development in anti-shipping missiles, but 
much less so regarding weapons and (changes to) concepts intended for attacking land-based 
targets such as airbase facilities, runways, shelters, communication nodes and so on. 
In sum, the Analyses were nevertheless clear on how new fighter aircraft should be used.  
Priority should be given to anti-shipping and DCA operations. The number and type of new 
fighters were based on a 15-year budget (that in the words of the S-12 was relatively loosely 
justified) of NOK 4 billon. 271  CACs 3 and 5 represented the most interesting fighters. Taking 
into account that up to 30% of these NOK 4 billon would have to be spent on improving the 
K&V System and the air bases’ maintenance, weapon support and RRR capacity, one could 
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6 The Analysis in perspective, and conclusions  
Norway, including her Armed Forces, was in need of rebuilding after WW II. Soon the Soviet 
Union, bordering Norway in the northeast, emerged as a new and formidable threat. Norway 
had limited resources, and political authorities did not believe that Norway was able to defend 
herself alone.  
It seems reasonably clear that the priority given to the offensive use of fighter aircraft during 
the 1950s and 1960s essentially stemmed more from NATO doctrines and war plans and the 
type of fighter-bomber aircraft the RNoAF received through US weapon aid programmes, 
than being the result of national priorities. SNOWCAT missions illustrate this quite well. 
These RNoAF wartime fighter-bomber operations were offensive missions aimed at 
destroying Soviet radars and at creating overload in the Soviet command- and control 
systems, paving the way for NATO nuclear bombers. Although gradually losing priority from 
the late 1960s, RNoAF squadrons kept SNOWCAT missions as wartime tasking until the mid 
1970s. 
The overall aim of the Analyses was to find what effects various usage of resources in the 
combat aircraft sector, including the use of some resources on associated support functions, 
would have on ‘holding time’ as a whole. The studies of supporting functions were quite 
typical in a Systems Analysis perspective. However, in a national defence planning 
perspective this seems to have been rather new. In the NDRE study in 1963, resulting in the 
purchase of F-5s for the RNoAF, the MoE were set to be the average number of targets 
destroyed by a squadron. Although the 1963 studies did take into consideration enemy 
invading forces, they still differed quite substantially from the Analyses that were initiated at 
the NDRE six years later. The most visible difference is of course the much broader approach 
one took on in the 1970-74 Analyses. This is not only reflected in the development of CACs 
and the quite extensive studies of what effects that would result from various usage of fighter 
aircraft, but also in the studies regarding the K&V System, the Air Bases maintenance and 
RRR capacities, and that a defined budget was set in advance.  
 
I have found the scenario and the MoE to be of vital importance for the Analyses. These two 
elements originated at the NDRE and were finalised with a close eye to political signals, and 
thorough discussions and ultimately the approval by the Armed Forces. Since 1946 political 
authorities on several occasions pointed out that Norway could not defend herself alone. 
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Based on these signals, it could be argued to be quite natural that one planned so as to be able 
to receive allied reinforcements before it was too late. Moreover, the Parliament was utterly 
clear in Stortingsmelding 37 (issued in spring 1968), the plan for the organisation and 
activities of the Armed Forces for the next five years. In this plan it was clearly stated that as 
all-out war had become less likely, focus would now be on smaller conflicts and their 
potential for escalation. Moreover the long term plan stated that mounting the strongest 
possible defence, and preparing in the best way possible for getting allied assistance 
continued to be the cornerstone of Norway’s defence efforts. Lastly; neither the expectations 
set forth to the NDRE could have been clearer. One would in the coming years make the most 
of the institution’s capabilities in defence planning.  
The selection of ‘holding time’ as MoE therefore – at least in retrospect – appears to have 
been a natural and perhaps even obvious choice in its time. But although the MoE was 
decided upon by the end of 1970, this did however not happen without discussions. It seems 
that a main reason for these discussions is that in an Air Force perspective, ‘holding time’ was 
seen to be rather vague compared to the 1963-analysis MoE. Having the effectiveness of 
RNoAF fighters measured by the number of destroyed invading enemy targets would 
certainly be a more direct and tangible method than having it measured by contributions to an 
overall ‘holding time’. As it turned out (although reading too much into the number of hours 
was warned against) the Analyses determined the effect of various fighter operations down to 
the hour. It is nevertheless my opinion that ‘holding time’, as defined and used in the 
Analyses, on the whole is definitely a land-oriented MoE: All activity focused on the land 
situation, and the entire defence was indeed aimed at denying Soviet control over a defined 
piece of territory. As a digression; would it be possible to establish a ‘sub-MoE’ for the 
fighter’s air-to-air efforts in the anti-invasion campaign, similar to what was the case 
regarding the anti-shipping part? It could namely be that the goal of stopping 50% or more of 
the invading Soviet sea-vessels in fact was a ‘sub-MoE’.       
The same political signals were arguably valid in respect to defining the scenario as well. I 
have found that Scenario 2a corresponded quite well to contemporary Soviet threat 
assessments, both NATO and national. It was however never argued that the scenario was 
selected because it was the most probable one. The reason for selecting it was simply that it 
represented the type of conflicts that could be manageable given the resources foreseen to be 
available for the structuring of national Armed Forces. Put another way; it would on one hand 
never be an option not to have national Armed Forces. On the other; a small nation like 
Norway could simply never have matched the resources available to the enemy anyway. 
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Therefore, selecting a scenario representing larger and/or more complex conflicts would 
simply be to fight with the setting. It would thus be best to base the Analyses on a scenario in 
which national forces – structured in an optimized way – could deliver maximum effect with 
regard to both deterring and raising the threshold for the opening of the  conflict, as well as 
influencing the outcome. Regarding the development of the scenario as such sources at hand 
suggest that this was mainly the work of the NDRE, although the FO/E did provide 
information on Soviet types and amount of land, air and naval forces. The impression that the 
NDRE developed most of the scenario, and that in this respect the FO/E took only a minor 
part, seems to be backed by the book ‘Strengt Hemmelig – Norsk etterretningstjeneste 1945-
1970’ [‘Top Secret – Norwegian Intelligence Services 1945 - 1970’] by Olav Riste and 
Arnfinn Moland. 273 Here it is stated that in this period Norwegian military intelligence was 
mainly arranged so as to collect and record Soviet military capacity, not to analyse what these 
data could mean. 
 
The scenario, and with it the Analyses itself, rests quite heavily on a few vital assumptions.  
The assumptions are openly stated and in general well explained. However, I have found 
reason to question the assumption that only Soviet forces already stationed reasonably close to 
Norway would be used in an invasion. Air forces stationed in neighbouring Soviet MDs could 
have reinforced the attacking Soviet forces relatively quickly as soon as the operations had 
been started. I have also found expectations to the development in Anti-Shipping missiles to 
be quite optimistic, but have not found the same regarding other weapons or other concepts of 
operations – for instance aimed at destroying or hampering air operations from airfields. It is 
however the nature of assumptions that they are made in advance of events, for later to be 
scrutinized in the light of facts and hindsight.  
It was of course absolutely necessary to make assumptions. It would otherwise have been 
impossible to carry out analysis and come up with results on which long term defence 
planning decisions could be based. It could be argued that through establishing the 2a scenario 
and ‘holding time’ as MoE, the NDRE not only set premises for the Analyses, but indeed also 
for national security policy. The NDRE carried out a broad Defence Analysis that was 
completed in 1978.274  This Defence Analysis was to a great extent based on the Combat 
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Aircraft Analyses and similar analysis for both the Army275 and the Navy.276 Although the 
Defence Analysis also looked into a scenario covering an attack on Norway as a whole, the 2a 
scenario was kept and so was ‘holding time’ as MoE. Looking into this matter could be a 
most interesting future research and thesis. For instance, did the Analyses results motivate a 
strengthened effort to get more allied forces earmarked for wartime missions in defence of 
Norway? Or; did it provide motivations for Norway and its Allies to establish large (ally) 
depots of military material on Norwegian soil? 
A surprise attack in which Soviet forces quickly reached their invasion goals, a fait accompli, 
would probably have been a “worst case” scenario. Invading forces were therefore to be 
engaged immediately, thus making it clear that a NATO member had been attacked. Given 
the strength of Soviet forces one would have to fight under withdrawal, aiming at causing 
sufficient delays so that allied help could arrive before the Soviets reached their goals. The 
Analyses thus set out to find how resources available in the combat aircraft sector could best 
be used in order to produce the most ‘holding-time’. ‘Holding-time’ was given in hours. It 
would vary with the amount and use of own fighters and Soviet strategy, and reflected the 
amount of time that would elapse before Soviet forces had seized control over the Bardufoss-
region. One went about this task paying close attention to available resources. Up to 30% of a 
NOK 4 billon budget could be spent on improving the K&V system and Airbase support 
functions, included RRR capacity.277 The rest would be spent on new fighter aircraft and 
running costs over 15 years. As long as the budget did not vary outside NOK 2 to 7 billion the 
CAC 3 would be the better alternative. 278 Given more than NOK 7 billon a fleet of the more 
advanced CAC 5s would have been the best option.  
Although it was realized quite early that the RNoAF would not be able to have all kinds of 
capabilities, I have found that the RNoAF nevertheless strived for a more balanced capacity 
within its fighter fleet during the 1950s and 1960s than it actually achieved. One in particular 
made an effort to get AWX fighters. The priority to the offensive, with SNOWCAT missions 
as perhaps the most typical example, thus seems to stem more from the US weapon aid 
programmes and allied war plans and strategies than the results of Norwegian initiatives and 
planning.  
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With the 1970-74 Combat Aircraft Analyses this was changed. I have found that the 2a 
scenario and ‘holding time’ as MoE are crucial both as basis and prerequisite to the Analyses. 
And, almost equally important, the use of a pre-determined budget-size seems to have played 
a vital role. Through defining an anticipated amount of money to be available for the purchase 
and 15 years of expected life cycle of the new aircraft, one to a great extend made it possible 
to carry out analysis that could end up with clear alternatives; i.e. reaching findings and being 
able to make recommendations on which long term planning decisions could be made. But 
also other assumptions, for instance on how Soviet air strategies would be, or that only nearby 
Soviet forces would participate in the invasion, helped providing the same: Manageable 
analysis with results that could be used for decision-making. The idea was simply to make 
new RNoAF fighters contribute to the overall defence of Norway in the best possible way. 
The ‘best way’ would certainly not be to take on the task of fighting off a Soviet invasion 
alone; such an endeavour would quite simply be out of Norway’s capabilities. The ‘best way’ 
would be to delay Soviet advance as much as possible, and through that prevent them from 
reaching their objectives before Norway’s Allies could provide assistance. Hence the MoE 
was set to be ‘holding time’.  
 
In my thesis I have set out to explore why and how the RNoAF changed from having an 
offensive to a clearly defensively postured fighter fleet. In conclusion I have found that the 
NDRE was fundamental to this relatively sharp change, which came about based on the1970-
74 Analysis. The Analyses were greatly based on the 2a scenario, ‘holding time’ as MoE, and 
a pre-defined amount of resources available. The main tool of the NDRE was quantitative 
methods, and one never let go of the ambition of reaching results that could form basis upon 
which long term planning decisions could be made. The Analyses thus left no doubt whereas 
to how RNoAF fighters should operate in war. RNoAF fighters would contribute to the most 
‘holding time’ through flying fly DCA and Anti-Shipping operations, and the best candidate 
given the expected amount of resources would be the CAC 3.  





The Analyses was no doubt also aimed at finding a replacement for the F-5s and the F-104s. 
The selection of the F-16 was done in competition with the French Mirage F-1, the Swedish 
Viggen JA-37 and the US Northrop F-17. The NDRE played an important role also in this 
process, but it was not part of the 1970-74 Analyses as such. The F-16 was never mentioned 
in any of the Analyses reports. 
The Analyses were based on several assumptions, of which some have proved right, others 
wrong. The new fighter was expected to be in service for 15 years, from 1980 to 1995. In 
hindsight this anticipation came to be only halfway correct. RNoAF did receive new fighters 
from 1980 and on, 72 F-16 Fighting Falcons, and the F-104s and the F-5s were eventually 
taken out of service. However, the F-16 was not retired in 1995; it is still operational with the 
RNoAF. Of course the Soviet Union never attacked Norway. Entering the 1990s the cold war 
ended and Soviet Union collapsed, just as the Norwegian-produced Penguin Anti-Shipping 
missiles became operational for the F-16.  
The Analysis did indeed govern the use of RNoAF fighters – and also much other 
development of the RNoAF - from entering the 1980s and for some two decades to come. 
‘Everybody’ knew what to do. As it turned out DCA became the modus operandi for the F-16 
during the two first decades of its operational service in the RNoAF. I completed my pilot 
training in the US and returned to Norway in summer 1990. Although the Berlin wall had 
come down and the Soviet Union and the WP were soon to disappear, the RNoAF modus 
operandi remained unaltered for several years. At my squadron at Ørland approximately 70% 
of the flying was in an air-to-air role, mostly DCA. We flew our air-to-air role armed with 
short-range heat seeking missiles and our internal gun, and did not get medium range radar 
guided missiles until the latter part of the 1990s. Our primary wartime task would be to fly 
CAP, either at pre-determined positions or as ordered starting from a ground alert state. The 
remaining 30% of our flying was in an anti-shipping role, and to some extent air-to-ground, 
using unguided rockets and dumb bombs. It may be that these 30% quite simply reflected the 
30% of CAC 3s necessary for Anti-Shipping operations in order to stop or destroy half of the 
Soviet invasion sea vessels.   
 The Anti-Shipping and air-to-ground flying, and events such as air-to-air gunnery flying, 
were typically organised into periods of two to three weeks. We flew however also in these 
periods some air-to-air training; for instance CAP waiting for the fighter-bomber package to 
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pass through our area of responsibility. As the 1980s ended the two F-16 squadrons in Bodø 
became operational with Penguin Anti-Shipping missile. After a while also my squadron 
started checkout on the Penguin, and became operational with it a couple of years into the 
1990s. In hindsight I find it debatable whether the Penguin actually met the requirements set 
forth in the Analyses. 
Both training and exercises reflected the 70-30 relationship between our air-to-air and Anti-
Shipping role, and thus the priority to DCA operations. Of the national exercises the so-called 
ECHO exercises may serve as a typical example. In these exercises, held a couple of times per 
year, most of the RNoAF participated. There would typically be two organised forces; Blue 
and Orange. The K&V System would build an air picture, provide scramble orders if fighters 
were put on ground alert, and of course provide airborne fighters with intercept control. 
Airbases would be typical targets. The K&V System would warn the applicable airbase about 
incoming enemy attack, so that any remaining fighters on ground could either take off or 
return to their respective HAS (Hardened Aircraft Shelter), and of course so that local SAM 
units could get ready to defend the airbase.  NATO Tactical Evaluations of the airbase and its 
squadrons and units, in this period typically held every other year, involved mostly the same 
kind of activity. It was however not only the air operations that were evaluated. Also 
resources available, and in particular the ability to regain operational status and resume 
operations were evaluated. To ensure this several concepts and various procedures were 
developed and put in effect. For instance procedures for post-attack inspections of taxiways 
and runways were established, and regularly trained. One could then determine the need for 
repairs, and prioritize RRR capabilities so that a Minimum Operating Strip (a MOS; the 
minimum piece of runway required for reassuming operations) could be opened as soon as 
possible, and not later than given time requirements. Also the aircraft repair and turnaround 
capacity was evaluated, including the ability to arm the aircraft with a new weapon load and 
thus be ready for a new mission. In addition, to further increase the ability to operate after 
attacks, we regularly made use of some of the many Norwegian short-runway airfields; 
runways typically of 800 to 1,000 meters. Also the sustainability of the K&V System was 
improved, through the construction of radars that could be retracted down into the mountain if 
needs be. The idea was to have radar overlap; i.e. being able to monitor a certain space around 
each radar using other radar(-s) nearby. Through this one could react to incoming threats and 
avoid the destruction of radar heads by retracting them, but immediately put the radar back 
into operation once the threat had moved on or been eliminated by, for instance, own fighters.  
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In hindsight it is my view that up to the point where our F-16s underwent the Mid-Life 
Update programme (late 1990s), the F-16s that the RNoAF operated in the 1980s and 1990s 
had essentially the same capabilities as when the airplanes where received in 1980. However, 
it is nevertheless my impression that the F-16 was a better aircraft than a CAC 3 fighter.  How 
big (or small) the difference actually was between a typical CAC 3, a CAC 5 fighter and the 
F-16 is hard to determine exactly. It is however my impression that the F-16 was perhaps not 
purchased in sufficient numbers; a notion that is actually backed up by the 1978 Defence 
Analysis.279   
 
We flew DCA operations as our primary role, and Anti-Shipping as our secondary. It is 
perhaps symptomatic that the 1969 doctrine slowly disappeared. It was soon out of sight and 
out of use, not to be replaced by a new RNoAF doctrine until the late 1990s. We simply didn’t 
need one. The outcome of the Analyses was sufficient. With that we had our doctrine - 
everyone knew who the enemy was, and how, where and why to fight if the worst thing 
happened.  
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NOAH  Norwegian Adapted Hawk system  
NSAM  National Security Action Memorandum  
OCA   Offensive Counter Air 
OR   Operations Research  
RAF   Royal Air Force  
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RNoAF  Royal Norwegian Air Force 
RRR   Runway Rapid Repair 
SA   Systems Analysis  
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander Europe  
SADTC  SHAPE Air Defence Technical Centre  
SAM   Surface to Air Missiles 
SHAPE  Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe 
SNOWCAT  Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Attacks 
STA   Soviet Tactical Aviation 
ØKN   Commander of Northern Norway (Øverstkommanderende Nord-Norge) 
 
